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(Purpose of the Principles)
These Principles set forth general rules for international commercial contracts.
They shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed 
by them. (*)
They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed 
by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like.
They may be applied when the parties have not chosen any law to govern their 
contract.
They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law instruments.
They may be used to interpret or supplement domestic law.
They may serve as a model for national and international legislators.
 (*) Parties wishing to provide that their agreement be governed by the Principles 
might use the following words, adding any desired exceptions or modifi cations:
“This contract shall be governed by the UNIDROIT Principles (2004) [except 
as to Articles . . . ]”.
Parties wishing to provide in addition for the application of the law of a 
particular jurisdiction might use the following words:
“This contract shall be governed by the UNIDROIT Principles (2004) [except as 
to Articles . . . ], supplemented when necessary by the law of [jurisdiction X]”.
I. Purposes and legal nature of the PICC 1, 2
1. The PICC as a restatement: the
description of a common core 3, 4
2. The PICC as a model: the prescription
of potentially binding rules 5, 6
3. The PICC as effective law: the
prescription of actually binding rules 7, 8
4. The PICC as a general part of
transnational contract law  9
II. Scope of the PICC (paragraph 1
of the Preamble) 
1. The function of paragraph 1 10, 11
2. ‘Rules’ 12, 13
3. ‘General’ 
(a) Not specifi c to individual countries 14–16
(b) General contract law 17
(c) General character of rules 18
4. ‘Contracts’ 19, 20
5. ‘International’ 21–24
6. ‘Commercial’ 25–28
III. Applicability by courts
(paragraphs 2–4 of the Preamble) 29
1. The function of paragraphs 2–4 30, 31
2. Applicability as law chosen by the parties 
(paragraph 2 of the Preamble) 
(a) Different ways of choosing the
PICC 32–36
(b) Effects of choice 37–44
(c) Choice of law clause 45–48
(d) Solutions under existing legal
regimes 49–63
3. Choice of general principles of law or 
lex  mercatoria (paragraph 3 of the
Preamble) 64–67
4. Applicability without a choice by the
parties (paragraph 4 of the Preamble) 
(a) The PICC as objective substantive
law 68–70
(b) Solutions under existing confl ict
of laws regimes 71–81
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I. Purposes and legal nature of the PICC
The Preamble, structured in seven paragraphs and an offi cial footnote, suggests a long list 
of purposes for the PICC that is not even exhaustive.1 However, the purposes can be grouped 
according to types. Frequently, merely two types are distinguished: the PICC aim to be both 
a description (of existing law outside the PICC) and a prescription (of a codifi ed set of 
rules);2 they are a combination of restatement and pre-statement.3 In reality, the latter pur-
pose must be further divided into one of potential prescription (the PICC as a model for 
norm makers) and one of actual prescription (the PICC as currently applicable law).4 These 
three types of purposes—description, potential prescription, and actual prescription—are 
partly complementary to and partly in confl ict with each other.
1 Off Cmt 8 to Preamble, p 7 (‘Other purposes’), introduced in 2003; (2003) Study L – Misc 25, paras 588 
(Finn) and 593.
2 B Ancel, ‘Book Review’ [1997] Rev crit dr int privé 879, 882; LA DiMatteo, ‘Contract Talk: Reviewing 
the Historical and Practical Signifi cance of the Principles of European Contract Law’ (2002) 43 Harv Int’l LJ 
569, 576–577.
3 P Karrer, in H Honsell et al (eds), Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Privatrecht: Internationales Privatrecht 
(1996) Art 187 para 71; KP Berger, ‘The relationship between the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts and the new lex mercatoria’ [2000] ULR 153, 169; H Kronke, ‘The UN Sales 
Convention, the UNIDROIT Contract Principles and the Way Beyond’ (2005–2006) 25 J L & Com 451, 
458–459. 
4 This triad is developed in R Michaels, ‘Privatautonomie und Privatkodifi kation: Zu Anwendbarkeit 
und Geltung allgemeiner Vertragsrechtsprinzipien’ (1998) 62 RabelsZ 580, 584–591, 611–612, 623–624; 
it has been followed eg by T Petz, Die UNIDROIT Prinzipien für Internationale Handelsverträge (2001) 
68–71; F Burkart, Interpretatives Zusammenwirken von CISG und UNIDROIT Principles (2000) 51–56; 
A Gebele, Die Konvention von Mexiko (2002) 81. For a somewhat parallel triad (Rechtserkenntnisquelle, 
Rechtsgeltungsquelle, Rechtsgewinnungsquelle), see CW Canaris, ‘Die Stellung der “UNIDROIT Principles” 
und der “Principles of European Contract Law” im System der Rechtsquellen’ in J Basedow (ed), Europäische 
Vertragsrechtsvereinheitlichung und deutsches Recht (2000) 5; P Jung, ‘Der Einfl uss der UNIDROIT Principles 
auf das Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht’ in E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their 
Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 77, 80–84; U Teichert, Lückenfüllung 
im CISG mittels UNIDROIT-Prinzipien: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Wählbarkeit nichtstaatlichen Rechts (2007) 
44–46; for a discussion of Canaris in English, see M Heidemann, Methodology of Uniform Contract Law: 
The UNIDROIT Principles in International Legal Doctrine and Practice (2007) 137–145. But see R ‘Goode, 
‘Rule, Practice and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial Law’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 539, 553 (‘blurring the 
distinction between lex lata and lex ferenda’ ).
1
5. Application where choice of
law rules do not yield results 82
(a) Application when it cannot be
determined what law applies 83
(b) Application when the content of the
applicable law cannot be established 84–87
IV. Use for the purposes of interpretation
and supplementation
(paragraphs 5–6 of the Preamble) 
1. International uniform laws
(paragraph 5 of the Preamble) 88–98
(a) General issues 
(b) Special applications 99–110
2. Domestic law (paragraph 6
of the Preamble) 111–117
V. Use as a model (paragraph 7
of the Preamble) 
1. Legislation 118–119
(a) Global unifi cation 120–122
(b) Regional unifi cation 123–128
(c) National legislation 129–139
2. Contract drafting 140–145
3. Mediation 146
4. Legal education 147
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In early drafts of the PICC, the purposes were mentioned in draft Art 1.1 (Application of 
the Principles);5 later, ‘Purpose’ (draft Art 1.1) and ‘Application’ (draft Art 1.2) were even 
separated in two different articles.6 Only quite late were both purposes and application 
moved out of the black-letter articles into the Preamble.7 Their place in the Preamble is an 
adequate acknowledgement of the fact that the purposes, even more than the actual black-
letter articles, are merely aspirational: they suggest possible uses of the PICC but cannot 
and do not prescribe them.8
1. The PICC as a restatement: the description of a common core
The fi rst purpose, covered by the fi rst paragraph of the Preamble and characterized by 
the words ‘set forth’, consists of the description of actual valid legal rules of transna-
tional contract law. Modelled after the Restatements of the Law in the USA,9 the PICC 
assemble and systematize the ‘common core’ of current global contract law as found in 
national laws, international Conventions like the CISG, semi-offi cial rule codes like the 
INCOTERMS, and soft law.10 In this regard, the PICC are an academic work of com-
parative law like Ernst Rabel’s work on the sale of goods or the International Encyclopedia 
of Comparative Law,11 differing from these latter only in their form as a codifi cation. 
With regard to this purpose, they have aptly been described as a source not of law but 
for the recognition of law (Rechtserkenntnisquelle),12 similar to a secondary source of 
law.13
The PICC differ from purely descriptive common core projects14 in that they contain some 
rules that do not represent a common core. Where legal systems differ, the drafters of the 
PICC either went with the majority or chose what they deemed to be the best solution;15 
occasionally they declined altogether to deal with tough questions.16 Where the solutions of 
5 (1989) Study L – Doc 40 Rev 4, p 1 (Art 1.1).
6 (1992) CD (72) 6, p 10; (1992) Study L – Doc 51, pp 1–7: see draft Arts 1.1 (Purpose) and 1.2 
(Application).
7 (1993) Study L – Doc 40 Rev 11, p 1. 
8 (1993) CD (72) 19, pp 18–23, 26–27; G Parra-Aranguren, ‘Confl ict of Law Aspects of the Unidroit 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts’ (1994/95) Tulane LR 1239, 1248; Michaels (n 4 above) 593. 
For a different view, MA Pendón Meléndez, ‘Preámbulo’ in D Morán Bovio (ed), Comentario a los Principios de 
UNIDROIT para los Contratos del Comercio Internacional (2nd edn, 2003) 21–22, 45–46.
9 AT Rosett, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: A New Approach 
to International Commercial Contracts’ (1998) 46 Am J Comp L (suppl) 347, 355–356; MJ Bonell, An 
International Restatement of Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(3rd edn, 2005) 9–11, 45–46. 
10 For a list of particularly important sources, see Bonell (n 9 above) 47–48 n 45.
11 E Rabel, Das Recht des Warenkaufs (2 vols, 1936/1958); R David et al (eds), International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law (1973 ff–).
12 Canaris (n 4 above) 15–16; Jung (n 4 above) 81–82.
13 See R Michaels, ‘Retour aux sources? Droit et politiques des sources du droit contemporain aux Etats-Unis’ 
in Société de législation comparée and Cedroma (eds), Les sources du droit: aspects contemporains (2007) 97. 
14 P Bonassis et al (eds), The Formation of Contracts: A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems Conducted 
Under the Auspices of the Cornell Law School (2 vols, 1968); M Bussani and U Mattei, ‘The Common Core 
Approach to European Private Law’ (1998) 3 Colum J Eur L 339. 
15 Governing Council of UNIDROIT, ‘Introduction to the 1994 Edition’ in UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004 (2004) xiv, xv; Bonell (n 9 above) 45–47.
16 EA Farnsworth, ‘Closing Remarks’ (1992) 40 Am J Comp L 699, 700.
2
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all legal systems seemed inappropriate, in particular for international contracts, they even 
developed entirely new solutions.17 Although this approach guaranteed a more comprehen-
sive and superior code, it meant that the individual provisions of the PICC do not necessar-
ily coincide with the solutions in individual legal systems. The PICC are not entirely 
descriptive, and not every one of their rules can be said to represent a general principle of 
contract law in a descriptive way. This problem is exacerbated because the text of each provi-
sion does not reveal whether it restates or innovates.18 This Commentary aims to provide 
further information on this issue by pointing out whether individual provisions represent a 
common core.
2. The PICC as a model: the prescription of potentially binding rules
The second purpose of the PICC, codifi ed in paragraphs 5–7 of the Preamble and charac-
terized by the words ‘may be used’ or ‘may serve as’, is to serve as a model law for both 
national and supranational legislators and as a guide for contracts between individual 
 parties. Although structurally similar to a code, the PICC differ from other transnational 
codifi cations like the CISG19 in that they themselves lack formal legitimacy derived from 
one or several states—they describe potentially optimal law, but they are not, for this pur-
pose, formally valid law themselves. As regards this second purpose, the PICC are aptly 
characterized as a private codifi cation20 or as a collective legislative doctrine:21 they function 
as ‘virtual law’.22
Whether the PICC represent an actual common core (see para 4 above) is relatively unim-
portant for this purpose: although a common core may evidence the superiority of one 
solution over others, it may also suggest common fl aws of legal systems. As a potential 
17 Bonell (n 9 above) 48–56.
18 ibid 49.
19 MJ Bonell, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and CISG: Alternatives or 
Complimentary Instruments?’ [1996] ULR 26, 27–30; IM Sattar, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts and the Vienna Sales Convention: Competing or Completing “Lex Mercatoria”?’ (1999) 
4 Int’l Trade & Bus L Ann 13, 22–23.
20 C Kessedjian, ‘La codifi cation privée’ in A Borrás et al (eds), E Pluribus Unum: Liber Amicorum Georges 
AL Droz (1996) 135; Michaels (n 4 above); Petz (n 4 above) 117; KP Berger, ‘The New Law Merchant and the 
Global Market Place: A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law’ (2000) Int’l ALR 91; K Osajda, 
‘The Experiences, Methods, Objectives and Perspectives of Unifi cation of Private Law in the European Union’ 
6–8 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=897403); J Fernandez Armesto, ‘Note on Separate Arbitral Award rendered 
in 2001 in SCC case 117/1999’ [2002] SAR 71, 74; J Jemielniak, ‘Legitimization Arguments in the Lex 
Mercatoria Cases’ (2005) 18 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 175, 182.
21 P Deumier, ‘La doctrine collective législatrice: une nouvelle source de droit?’ [2006] RTD civ 63, 65; 
similarly P Kahn, ‘Les Principes UNIDROIT comme droit applicable aux contrats internationaux’ in MJ Bonell 
and F Bonelli (eds), Contratti commerciali internazionali e Principi UNIDROIT (1997) 39, 44 (‘construction 
savante’); see also B Ancel, ‘Auctoritate rationis, Le droit savant du contrat international’ in Clès pour le 20ème 
siècle: Mélanges de l’Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas (2000) 583.
22 D Mazeaud, ‘A propos du droit virtuel des contrats: réfl exions sur les principes d’UNIDROIT et de la 
commission Lando’ in Mélanges Michel Cabrillac (1999) 205; P Mankowski, ‘Überlegungen zur sach- und 
interessengerechten Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs’ [2003] RIW 2, 11; 
general European contract law is described as ‘virtual law’ in H Kötz, European Contract Law (1997) v; C 
Castronovo, ‘Codifi cation and the Idea of Codifi cation in the Principles of European Contract Law’ in LL 
Andersen et al (eds), Festskrift til Ole Lando (1997) 109, 123.
5
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prescription, the PICC must convince through their superior quality. Although they have 
been praised as ‘the most accurate description to date of the emerging international consen-
sus about the rules that are most suitable to international trade law’,23 this quality must be 
proven for each and every provision, and some provisions are more convincing than others. 
In addition, the PICC are more appropriate for international contract legislation than for 
domestic codifi cations or for very specifi c contracts, since they provide a general law of 
contract and are aimed at international commercial contracts (see paras 14–18 and 21–29 
below).
3. The PICC as effective law: the prescription of actually binding rules
The third purpose, covered by paragraphs 2–4 of the Preamble and characterized by the 
words ‘shall’ or ‘may be applied’,24 is both more important and more controversial than the 
fi rst two. It consists of the actual prescription of effective (applicable) rules that bind par-
ties and adjudicators. The suggestion is that the PICC can provide applicable norms when 
parties select them as applicable law (paragraphs 2–3 of the Preamble) and even when they 
have not selected any law to be applicable (paragraph 4 of the Preamble). This purpose of 
actual prescription poses a twofold challenge to traditional conceptions of law. First, trad-
itionally only ‘offi cial’ law can be the applicable law: the law either of states or of certain 
groups (religious or otherwise) recognized by states as competent lawmakers. An autono-
mous law of commerce, a lex mercatoria, has mostly been rejected as applicable law at least 
in state courts; the situation is somewhat different in arbitration. The PICC (other than 
ratifi ed UNIDROIT Conventions) share the unoffi cial status of lex mercatoria, they are 
different only in that they provide detailed rules. Second, whether laws are applicable or 
not in a given legal system is determined by that system’s own confl ict of laws rules. The 
PICC, by contrast, seemingly profess to provide these norms on their own in their 
Preamble.
In general, the extent to which the PICC can fulfi l this third purpose differs from rule to 
rule. Although details are discussed below, in general, the following ensues: insofar as the 
PICC fulfi l their restatement purpose and provide an accurate description of all actual laws 
(see paras 3–4 above), they can be said to be valid as a mere systematization, since their 
application would not contradict any otherwise applicable national laws. Where they fulfi l 
their model purpose and present a superior law (see paras 5–6 above), they can guide the 
decisions of an adjudicator, but only within the limits from otherwise applicable law (see 
paras 88–117 below); these limits are stricter for courts than for arbitrators (see below, 
Preamble II paras 3–4 and passim). Where the PICC fulfi l neither the restatement nor the 
model purpose, their application is not justifi ed except to the degree they are applicable 
within the limits provided by otherwise applicable law (see paras 30–87 below).
23 R Hyland, ‘On Setting Forth the Law of Contract: A Foreword’ (1992) 40 Am J Comp L 541, 550.
24 The use of ‘may’ rather than ‘shall’ is explained as an expression of self-restraint and modesty by MJ Bonell, 
‘The UNIDROIT Principles a Decade After Their First Appearance: What Have They Achieved and What Are 
Their Prospects for the Future?’ in E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their 
Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 259, 260.
7
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4. The PICC as a general part of transnational contract law 
In content the PICC play the role of a ‘general part’ of the transnational law of obligations.25 
In this regard, they are modelled less after the lex mercatoria and more after the ius commune 
in continental Europe26 and the common law of contract in England or the USA. As a gen-
eral part of a transnational law of obligations, they leave room on the one hand for manda-
tory norms of domestic and supranational origin (Art 1.4), and on the other hand for 
specifi c agreements in contractual agreements (Art 1.5). Properly understood, they do not 
aim to replace or suppress either mandatory norms or contractual agreements; they are, by 
design, incomplete and supplemental. This focus equips them better for some purposes: 
for example, the fi lling of gaps and the interpretation of unclear provisions in statutes and 
contractual agreements, and the provision of background norms. It equips them worse for 
other purposes, such as the replacement or avoidance of mandatory domestic norms or 
guidance for specifi c contractual agreements.
II. Scope of the PICC (paragraph 1 of the Preamble)
1. The function of paragraph 1
Paragraph 1 of the Preamble is modelled after the provisions on scope of application in 
other international instruments, such as Art 1 CISG. However, unlike Art 1 CISG (which 
deals only with applicability), paragraph 1 applies differently to the different purposes of 
the PICC. Regarding their restatement purpose (see paras 3–4 above), paragraph 1 pro-
claims that the PICC restate existing rules for international contracts. This is only partially 
adequate, because the PICC were infl uenced not only by international codifi cations and 
usages, but also by domestic contract laws.27 Regarding the model purpose (see paras 5–6 
above), paragraph 1 proclaims that the rules of the PICC are deemed superior especially for 
international commercial contracts, not for other areas of the law. This seems appropriate 
insofar as the interests of international commerce were infl uential in the drafting process. 
Nonetheless, a legislator is not barred from using them as a model for a general contract 
code treating purely local and non-commercial contracts, and indeed this is where they have 
been most infl uential so far (see paras 128–138 below). Regarding their effective law pur-
pose (see paras 7–8 above), paragraph 1 proclaims that where the PICC are the rules applic-
able in a dispute, this applicability is confi ned to international contracts. However, because 
the Preamble, like the whole of the PICC (and unlike Art 1 CISG), is not binding, an adju-
dicator may and indeed should consider paragraph 1, but would not thereby be barred from 
applying the PICC to a non-commercial or a non-international contract. Consequently, 
‘given the particular character of the Principles, there was no absolute necessity to offer a 
25 P Karrer, ‘Internationalization of Civil Procedure: Beyond the IBA Rules of Evidence’ [2004] ULR 893, 
895; S Schilf, ‘UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Auf dem Weg zu einem Allgemeinen Teil des internationalen 
Einheitsprivatrechts’ [2004] IHR 236, 236–246; Kronke (n 3 above) 456–457.
26 Bonell (n 9 above) 3–4.
27 See para 3 above and Bonell (n 9 above) 46–47.
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precise defi nition of their scope of application’,28 and defi nitions of ‘international’ and 
‘commercial’ that had been contained in earlier drafts were deleted.29
It follows that paragraph 1 contains mere general suggestions for their scope whose exact 
adequacy must be assessed individually for each use. This tentative use is clear from the 
language (‘set forth’).30 The limitation to international commercial contracts derives its 
persuasive force from the fact that the drafters intended the rules for a specifi c scope and 
therefore tried to optimize them with this scope in mind. Any use that goes beyond this 
scope runs the risk of using rules for purposes for which they were not made. Any use that 
stays below this scope runs the risk of isolating rules from what is conceived as a coherent 
whole.
2. ‘Rules’
The name ‘Principles’ could suggest that the PICC contain general directives rather than 
specifi c regulations. This is true only for some articles, such as Art 1.1 on ‘Freedom of con-
tract’ or Art 1.7 on ‘Good faith and fair dealing’. Mostly, the PICC set forth relatively spe-
cifi c rules.31 Indeed, it is possible (and even necessary for their supplementation, see Art 
1.6(2)) to derive general principles from the rules of the PICC themselves.32 With now 185 
articles, the PICC are longer and, at least partly, more detailed than the general law of obli-
gations in traditional codes like the French or German Cc.
Genetically, the name ‘Principles’ is an indirect remnant from the ‘General Principles’ 
listed in Art 38(1)(c) of the Statute for the International Court of Justice of 26 June 1945 as 
one of the sources of international law. The name ‘Principles’ was retained (largely for rhe-
torical reasons) only after a long debate and only for the English version; discretion was 
given for each translation.33 Following the suggestion of a German member of the drafting 
team (Drobnig) who had preferred ‘Rules’ over ‘Principles’, the German version carries the 
28 (1992) CD (72) 6, p 9.
29 cf (1989) Study L – Doc 40 Rev 4, p 1 (Art 1(2)):
 ‘For the purpose of these Principles:
 (a) a contract is international whenever it involves a choice between the laws of different countries;
 (b)  a contract is of a commercial nature whenever it is made by both parties in the course of their trade 
or profession.’
30 Even more tentative (‘intend to lay down’) was (1989) Study L – Doc 40 Rev 4, p 1 (Art 1.1(1)).
31 Michaels (n 4 above) 586; Bonell (n 9 above) 21–22; S Schilf, Allgemeine Vertragsgrundregeln als 
Vertragsstatut (2005) 41. Too much weight is put on the name ‘Principles’ by Rosett (n 9 above) 355–356; 
H van Houtte, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts’ (1996) 2 Int’l Trade & 
Bus L Ann 1, 10–11.
32 A list of fi ve ‘basic ideas’ (freedom of contract; openness to usages; favor contractus; observance of good 
faith and fair dealing; policing against unfairness) is presented in Bonell (n 9 above) chapter 4; see also below, 
Art 1.6 paras 25, 52–53. Similarly, for the PECL see O Lando, ‘Eight Principles of European Contract Law’ 
in R Cranston (ed), Making Commercial Law: Essays in Honour of Roy Goode (1997) 103–129; for the CISG 
see U Magnus, ‘General Principles of UN-Sales Law’ (1997) 3 Int’l Trade & Bus L Ann 33, 41; for all three 
see S Guillemard, ‘A Comparative Study of the UNIDROIT Principles, the Principles of the European Law 
of Contracts, and some Dispositions of the CISG Applicable to the Formation of International Contracts’ 
(2000–2001) Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 83, 97–111 
33 See the debate in (1994) PC – Misc 19, pp 117–122. 
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title Grundregeln (basic rules). This notion is more accurate than that of ‘Principles’ used for 
all other language versions.
3. ‘General’
(a) Not specifi c to individual countries
The rules of the PICC are general in several ways. First, the PICC contain, at least at their 
core, rules that are not specifi c to individual countries but rather ‘refl ect concepts to be 
found in many, if not all, legal systems’,34 a global common core. They thus go beyond the 
UCC and the US Restatements, which are confi ned to the USA (though both are inspired 
in part by comparative law). They also go beyond the PECL, which are restricted to 
European legal systems, and even the CISG, which is confi ned to signatory states.
The general character of the PICC is also evidenced in the aim to use a neutral terminology 
that is not peculiar to any given legal system.35 Sometimes terms used in practice (like ‘hard-
ship’ in Arts 6.2.2–6.2.3) are preferred over technical terms (like ‘frustration of purpose’, 
Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, and imprévision); sometimes new terms (like ‘non-perform-
ance’) are preferred over terms existing in domestic law (like ‘breach’).36 However, where 
rules were more or less adopted from existing Conventions like the CISG, the existing terms 
and formulations were adopted.37
Despite their aim at generality, the predominant infl uence comes from Western legal sys-
tems.38 The Offi cial Comment to the PICC, unlike that to the PECL, refrains deliberately 
from referring to the inspiring sources in part to downplay such an impression.39 The 
Western character of the PICC can cause problems in context with non-Western legal juris-
dictions, problems that can be enhanced by the requirement to interpret the PICC without 
reference to local rules or habits.40 Inhabitants of developing countries, for example, may 
fi nd themselves unable to comply with the strict notice requirements of the PICC.41 Most 
procedural deadlines in Latin American countries, by contrast, are much shorter than in the 
PICC. The PICC may also be, in parts, incompatible with Islamic law. In particular, the 
Islamic ban on interest may collide with rules on interest (Arts 7.4.9–7.4.10).42 By contrast, 
34 Governing Council of UNIDROIT (n 15 above) xv; (1994) PC – Misc 19, p 3. For criticism, see Teichert 
(n 4 above) 59–65.
35 Governing Council of UNIDROIT (n 15 above) xv; Off Cmt 2 to Art 1.6, p 16; Bonell (n 9 above) 
65–68.
36 Off Cmt to Art 7.1.1, p 193.
37 Governing Council of UNIDROIT (n 15 above) xv.
38 Bonell (n 9 above) 47: ‘For obvious reasons it was impossible to take into account the law of every single 
country of the world, nor could every legal system have an equal infl uence on each issue at stake’.
39 ibid 339.
40 ibid 83; see below, Art 1.6 paras 7–8.
41 For the CISG see SG Zwart, ‘The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage between Socialist, Third 
World, Common and Civil Law Principles’ (1988) 13 North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation 109, 118–120.
42 TS Twibell, ‘Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (the CISG) Under Shari’a (Islamic Law): Will Article 78 of the CISG Be Enforced when the Forum 
Is in an Islamic State?’ (1997) 9 International Legal Perspectives 25; DM Vicente, ‘A unifi cação do direito dos 
contratos em África: Seu sentido e limites’ 15–16 (www.fd.ul.pt/ICJ/luscommunedocs/vicentedario1.pdf ); see 
below, Art. 7.4.9 para 3.
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Art 10.9(1) was introduced in response to Islamic concerns.43 Confl icts with socialist law, 
which had little infl uence on the PICC, are no longer an important issue. Within Western 
legal cultures, the PICC do not prioritize the civil law over the common law despite their 
codifi ed form, since much of their substance is derived from common law systems, espe-
cially the UCC.44
(b) General contract law
A second meaning of ‘general’ concerns the fact that the PICC treat the general law of obli-
gations and the general law of contract in the style of the German Cc.45 They can be used 
for any type of contract, but rules for specifi c contracts must be drawn from elsewhere: 
either specifi c uniform law (such as the CISG) or domestic laws. Moreover, the PICC do 
not (yet) provide a comprehensive system of general contract law; to prevent such an impres-
sion, an earlier draft version that spoke of a ‘comprehensive system’ was amended accord-
ingly.46 Important parts of the general law of obligations are still lacking and may be taken 
up in later revisions.47
(c) General character of rules
A third meaning of ‘general’ concerns the open-ended style of many articles. While some 
provisions contain defi nite bright-line rules,48 others, even if they are detailed, refrain from 
exact regulation and leave discretion to the judge or arbitrator,49 in accordance with other 
modern codifi cations.50 Furthermore, the drafters considered it necessary to account for the 
different styles of users from different legal systems, especially (but not exclusively) civil and 
common lawyers. It should be noted, however, that such an open-ended style requiring 
adjudicators to interpret the relevant terms is in tune more with the civil law than with the 
common law tradition, which traditionally prefers clearly defi ned terms for legislative and 
quasi-legislative instruments.
4. ‘Contracts’
The PICC set forth rules for contracts—not, at least on their face, for non-contractual or 
quasi-contractual obligations, nor for other areas of the law (like the transfer of property). 
A defi nition is not given and would indeed be hard to give in view of differences between 
43 Bonell (n 9 above) 349–350; see (1999) Study L – Misc 21, para 293 (El Kholy); below, Art 10.9 para 1.
44 A di Majo, ‘I “Principles” dei contratti commerciali internazionali tra Civil Law e Common Law’ [1995] 
Riv dir civ 609; cf GC Moss, ‘International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law 
to Be Preferred? The Diffi culty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith’ (2007) 7(1) Global Jurist 
(Advances) Article 3, 34 (www.bepress.com/gj/vol7/iss1/art3).
45 For history and comparison, see R Michaels, ‘Systemfragen des Schuldrechts’ in M Schmoeckel et al (eds), 
Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar zum BGB, vol II (2007) paras 15–16, 51.
46 See the debate at (1994) PC – Misc 19, pp 1–2.
47 See para 9 above.
48 eg Arts 6.1.9 (Currency of payment), 7.1.4 (Cure by non-performing party), 10.5 (Supension of limitation 
by judicial proceedings), and 10.6 (Suspension by arbitral proceedings). The examples are from Bonell (n 9 
above) 61.
49 For interpretation of the PICC, see Art 1.6 PICC.
50 B Volders, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and Dutch Law’ in 
E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on Contractual Practice, 
Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 135, 136–137, 139–140.
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legal systems.51 This does not normally lead to problems; the scope of the PICC can be 
derived from their provisions without the need for a defi nition.
Some provisions, like those on set-off, limitation periods, and the assignment of rights and 
transfer of obligations, pertain to the general law of obligations rather than just to the law 
of contract; accordingly, the provisions on assignment and transfer use terms like ‘obligor 
and obligee’ rather than ‘parties’.52 In theory, the PICC could thus be applicable to non-
contractual obligations and relations. That the drafters did not intend these rules to apply 
to such relations and that examples in the Offi cial Comment are drawn from contract law53 
does not automatically rule this out, but it is reason for caution in their use outside contract 
law. The law of limitation periods is an exception: Art 10.1(1) appropriately confi nes the 
scope of Chapter 10 of the PICC to ‘rights governed by these Principles’, and indeed, limi-
tation periods for non-contractual obligations are very different.
5. ‘International’
Unlike the PECL (Art 1:101 PECL), but comparable to the CISG (Art 1(1) CISG), the 
PICC are confi ned to international contracts. International is not positively defi ned; an 
earlier proposal to require parties of different nationalities was abandoned.54 The Offi cial 
Comment suggests giving the term ‘the broadest possible interpretation’;55 but this provides 
little guidance. A purely domestic contract does not become international simply through 
the parties’ choice of the PICC or some other law as applicable law.56 Apart from this 
extreme case, it appears appropriate to follow the French solution of Art 1492 NCPC and 
consider any contract international if it has an impact on international trade, without the 
need to draw a specifi c list of factors.57 A more specifi c defi nition appears unnecessary in 
view of the limited practical importance of the criterion (see paras 24–25 below).
Two reasons are given for this restriction.58 First, the PICC are considered particularly 
important for international contracts, for which domestic laws are viewed as inappropriate, 
confl ict of laws procedures to determine an applicable domestic law as cumbersome, and 
existing international instruments as insuffi cient. Second, countries are less eager to provide 
mandatory rules for international contracts than for domestic ones, because they do not 
want to disadvantage their citizens vis-à-vis those from other countries in international 
51 M Oudin, ‘Un droit européen . . . pour quel contrat? Recherches sur les frontières du contrat en droit 
comparé’ [2007] RIDC 475.
52 Arts 5.1.9, 6.1.3, 6.1.5–6.1.9, 6.1.12, 8.1, 9.1.7–9.1.13, 9.1.15, 9.2.1, 9.2.3–9.2.8, 9.3.5, 10.2, 10.4–
10.6, 10.8–10.11; a defi nition of the term is contained in Art 1.11.
53 M Fontaine, ‘Content and Performance’ (1992) 40 Am J Comp L 645; Bonell (n 9 above) 79.
54 n 29 above; (1994) PC – Misc 19, pp 3–4.
55 Off Cmt 1 to Preamble, p 2.
56 Art 3(3) of (Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L 177/6.
57 C Larroumet, ‘La valeur des Principes d’UNIDROIT applicables aux contrats du commerce international’ 
[1997] JCP 147, 148; for criteria see A Kaczorowska, ‘L’internationalité d’un contrat’ (1995) 72 RDIDC 
204; see also LE Mercado, ‘Faut-il repenser la notion de contrat international?’ [2002] Revue de la recherche 
juridique: Droit prospectif 1897.
58 Bonell (n 9 above) 68–71.
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commerce, so differences between legal systems are both less frequent and less crucial.59 
These reasons are valid but somewhat exaggerated at least for more modern domestic laws, 
which are often made also with international contracts in mind.
Some rules of the PICC are explicitly focused on international contracts and respond to 
problems arising from territorial differences in substantive laws (Arts 1.4 and 6.1.14), holi-
days (Art 1.12(2)), time zones (Art 1.12(3)), languages (Off Cmt 3 to Art 2.1.20, and Art 
4.7), local customs (Art 6.1.7(1)), prices (Arts 7.4.6(2) and 7.4.9(2); see also Art 5.1.7(1)), 
and currencies (Arts 6.1.9–6.1.10 and 7.4.9(2)). Some rules explicitly ban recourse to local 
laws (Off Cmts 2–4 to Art 1.4), local customs (Off Cmt 4 to Art 1.9), local standards 
(Off  Cmt 3 to Art 1.7) and local modes of interpretation (Art 1.6(1)). However, the vast 
majority of rules in the PICC cater for international and domestic contracts alike.
The restriction to international contracts does not apply exclusively. First, even purely local 
contracts can be submitted to the PICC to the extent that the PICC can be incorporated 
into such agreements;60 the restriction of paragraph 1 to ‘international contracts’ plays no 
role insofar.61 Although international contracts are the explicit focus of the PICC, applica-
bility (and eligibility) of the PICC are separate from this focus62 and party autonomy can 
trump the scope of the PICC. Second, the restriction is irrelevant where the PICC want to 
serve as a model for national contract legislation (see para 129 below). This is appropriate, 
in view of the trend for legislators worldwide to aim more and more for rules that are apt for 
international trade, and much of the substance of the PICC is either not specifi cally inter-
national or not in confl ict with rules for domestic contracts.
6. ‘Commercial’
The PICC are restricted to commercial contracts, but the notion ‘commercial’ is not 
defi ned. In explicit rejection of an earlier draft,63 the term ‘commercial contracts’ goes 
beyond actes de commerce or Handelsgeschäfte and beyond contracts between parties who are 
formally merchants (commerçants or Kaufl eute).64 As with regard to ‘international’ (see para 
21 above), the suggestion in the Offi cial Comment ‘that the concept of “commercial” con-
tracts should be understood in the broadest possible sense’, which emerged only after a long 
debate,65 again provides little guidance. Despite the terminological difference to the CISG 
which contains no similar restriction to commercial contracts but only excludes consumer 
sales in its Art 2(a) and the UCC,66 the underlying idea is essentially the same.67 The most 
59 ibid 69–71.
60 Off Cmt 3 to Preamble, p 3.
61 See the debate at (1994) PC – Misc 19, pp 3 and 7. For perhaps too-harsh criticism (‘useless’), see F Ferrari, 
‘Defi ning the Sphere of Application of the 1994 “UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts”’ (1995) 69 Tul LRev 1225, 1235–1237.
62 See para 12 above; (1994) PC – Misc 19, pp 8–9.
63 (1989) Study L – Doc 40 Rev 4, Art 1.1(2)(b): ‘For the purpose of these Principles: . . . a contract is of a 
commercial nature whenever it is made by both parties in the course of their trade or profession’.
64 Off Cmt 2 to Preamble, p 2; Bonell (n 9 above) 73; Art 1(3) CISG. For the German and French concepts, 
see § 343 German HGB and Art L 110-1 French Ccom.
65 Off Cmt 2 to Preamble, p 2; (1994) PC – Misc 19, p 7 (Bonell).
66 Art 2(a) CISG; § 1-103(a)(1) UCC (USA).
67 Bonell (n 9 above) 74–75.
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appropriate source for the defi nition of ‘commercial’ may be found in the footnote to Art 1 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law which lists a (non-exclusive) number of typical 
contracts.68
The most relevant element is the intended exclusion of consumer transactions.69 This 
exclusion is in tune with Art 2(a) CISG, but different from the PECL.70 Consumer transac-
tions are contracts entered into by a ‘consumer’, defi ned as ‘a party who enters into the 
contract otherwise than in the course of its trade or profession’.71 The exact defi nition is 
unclear, but it seems barely relevant. The emphasis in the PICC on good faith makes them 
suitable for consumer contracts as well; specifi c consumer protection can be dealt with in 
special legislation.72 The practical importance of the limitation is small: the PICC have been 
used as a model for a uniform law of contract, including consumer contracts,73 and play an 
important role as general law of contract (see para 18 above). Special rules on consumer 
protection can still be applied under Art 1.4 and can inform the good faith standard of 
Art 1.7.
One reason given for the exclusion—consumer law is tied to the local setting and the 
contracting cultures in different parts of the world are very different74—is inconclusive 
for international consumer contracts. More important is the argument that consumer 
law, like employment law, has developed differently from commercial contract law in 
most legal systems. This means that an actual description of a common core would be 
diffi cult to determine,75 and a potential or actual prescription would get into confl ict with 
strong regulatory interests. Moreover, rules explicitly drafted with the interests of inter-
national commerce in mind may, for that very reason, be unsuitable for consumer 
contracts.76
Employment contracts are meant not to be excluded from the scope of the PICC. 
Their drafters justify this with the diffi culty of distinguishing employment contracts from 
68 ‘Relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade 
transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation 
or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; fi nancing; 
banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other form of industrial or business 
co-operation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.’ Similarly Pendón Meléndez (n 8 above) 
39–40.
69 Off Cmt 2 to Preamble, p 2; Bonell (n 9 above) 74–76.
70 T Wilhelmsson, ‘International lex mercatoria and local consumer law: an impossible combination?’ [2003] 
ULR 141, 142–144.
71 Off Cmt 2 to Preamble, p 2; Art 2 CISG; F Ferrari, ‘The CISG’s sphere of Application: Articles 1–3 and 
10’ in F Ferrari et al (eds), The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond (2004) 21, 81–85.
72 I Veillard, ‘The General and Commercial Character of the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts’ [2007] Int’l Bus LJ 479, 486–490; for protection of the weaker party, see also G Alpa, 
‘La protezione della parte debole nei principi UNIDROIT dei contratti commerciali internazionali’ in G Alpa, 
Il diritto privato nel prisma della comparazione (2006) 252–267.
73 Veillard (n 72 above) 484–485; see paras 122–124 (OHADA), 125 (EU), and 126–127 below.
74 Wilhelmsson (n 70 above) 150–153, quoted approvingly by Bonell (n 9 above) 76.
75 Off Cmt 2 to Preamble, p 2.
76 Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Schlechtriem Art 1 para 60.
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other contracts.77 The distinction in treatment between consumer and employment con-
tracts is hardly convincing, since the situation in the employment context is not materially 
different from that for consumer contracts. The PICC are as adequate (or inadequate) for 
employment contracts as they are for consumer contracts.
III. Applicability by courts (paragraphs 2–4 of the Preamble)
Although the PICC do not distinguish between courts and arbitral tribunals (see Art 1.11), 
this section of the Commentary deals only with courts. The applicability by arbitral tribu-
nals is dealt with in a separate part of the Commentary.78
1. The function of paragraphs 2–4
No normative order can autonomously defi ne its own applicability in a way that binds other 
normative orders. This is true for the PICC as well: they do not apply by their own force. 
Whether, and to what extent, the PICC apply is determined by the norms binding the 
respective adjudicator confronted with them. It follows that neither the parties nor the 
adjudicator can choose the PICC directly unless the relevant confl ict of laws norm or norms 
of substantive contract law entitle them to do so. Paragraphs 2–4 may look like a choice of 
law rule, but in reality they merely suggest criteria for applicability for choice of law norms 
that national confl ict of laws norms may or may not adopt.79 That these paragraphs are 
placed in the Preamble instead of among the black-letter articles of the PICC is therefore 
appropriate (see para 2 above).
Application would be regulated in a quasi-universal fashion if it was laid down in a global 
Convention. However, no global Convention for choice of law in contract exists. A Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts of Sales has not entered into force;80 it does 
not provide for the applicability of non-state law. Currently, the Hague Conference for 
Private International Law is contemplating a non-binding instrument on choice of law in 
international contracts. A preliminary report considers the question whether the PICC and 
other Principles can be selected, but does not reach a conclusion.81 Whether a Convention 
project should be undertaken continues to be under review;82 what role the PICC would 
play in it is currently an open question.
77 (1994) PC – Misc 19, p 7.
78 See below, Preamble II.
79 Michaels (n 4 above) 593.
80 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (The Hague, 
22 December 1986) (www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=61).
81 Feasibility Study on the Choice of Law in International Contracts: Report on Work Carried Out and 
Preliminary Conclusions (Follow-Up Note), Prel Doc No 5 of February 2008, p10 (www.hcch.net/upload/
wop/genaff_pd05e2008.pdf ). See also MJ Bonell, ‘Towards a Legislative Codifi cation of the UNIDROIT 
Principles?’ [2007] ULR 233, 243.
82 Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council (1–3 April 2008) (www.hcch.net/upload/
wop/genaff_concl08e.pdf ). 
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2. Applicability as law chosen by the parties (paragraph 2 of the Preamble)
(a) Different ways of choosing the PICC
(1) The PICC as applicable law under choice of law. Whether the PICC can constitute the 
applicable law in the sense of choice of law depends on the respectively applicable rules on 
choice of law. These are the choice of law rules of the forum, irrespective of the choice of law 
rules of the law that would apply in the absence of the choice (as in Art 1:103 PECL). What 
matters is not whether the PICC are ‘law’ in a theoretical sense,83 but rather whether they are 
‘law’ in the sense of ‘applicable law’ as used within the respective choice of law norms.84 This is 
a question not of legal theory but of statutory interpretation (for choice of law codifi cations) 
and of legal reasoning (for legal systems with uncodifi ed choice of law regimes).
(2) The PICC as incorporated into the contract under substantive law. Even where the 
PICC cannot be chosen as applicable law in the sense of choice of law, the parties can 
incorporate them into their contract (as is frequently done with the UCP 500)85 within 
the freedom of contract that the applicable contract law grants. They thereby become law 
applicable between the parties, as it is famously formulated in Art 1134 French Cc. In 
this case, the PICC do not replace the otherwise applicable law but become applicable 
within the framework and limits set by that law. This means that the mandatory rules of 
that law remain applicable, even if they are not internationally mandatory.
Importantly, this freedom to incorporate the PICC by reference into the contract should not 
be confi ned by domestic laws on standard terms, like the national legislation implementing 
the European Standard Terms Directive.86 Although the Directive could apply by its terms, 
given that the PICC are, in this scenario, contractual terms which have not been individually 
negotiated (Art 3 of the Directive), it seems appropriate to ignore the Directive in view of the 
fact that the PICC are more similar to a neutral codifi cation than to ‘ordinary’ standard terms 
pre-formulated with the interests of one party or one type of market participant in mind.87
(3) The PICC as agreed rules under procedural freedom of disposal. Finally, parties may be 
able to invoke the PICC within the procedural autonomy granted by the applicable laws 
of civil procedure. They can thereby go beyond the limits not only of confl ict of laws,88 
but also of the applicable substantive law, to the extent that the parties can agree, with 
binding effect on the judge, on the content of the law applicable in litigation. This is so, 
83 Contra Schilf (n 31 above) 136, 141, 192; B Schinkels, ‘Die (Un-)zulässigeit einer kollisionsrechtlichen 
Wahl der UNIDROIT Principles nach Rom I: Wirklich nur eine Frage der Rechtspolitik?’ [2007] GPR 106.
84 Michaels (in 4 above); R Michaels, ‘The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law and 
the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism’ (2005) 51 Wayne Law Review 1209, 1237–1240.
85 (2006) Study L – Misc 25, para 22 (Goode).
86 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29. 
Since the Directive applies only to consumer contracts and the PICC apply only to commercial contracts, the 
question will rarely arise.
87 Canaris (n 4 above) 21–26; J Basedow, ‘Uniform Law Conventions and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts’ [2000] ULR 129, 132. But see also G Mäsch, Rechtswahlfreiheit und 
Verbraucherschutz (1993) 80–85, who argues that the standard terms act is applicable even to incorporated 
state law.
88 G Wagner, ‘Fakultatives Kollisionsrecht und prozessuale Parteiautonomie’ [1999] ZEuP 6, 21.
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for example, in France, where Art 12(3) NCPC binds the judge to an express agreement 
between the parties on the juridical foundations of their litigation, and Art 12(4) NCPC 
allows the parties to designate the judge as amiable compositeur. This means parties should 
be able to ask the judge for application of the PICC to the same degree as they could ask 
an arbitrator.89 Other procedural laws may provide comparable freedom.
(4) Differences in result. Although a great deal has been written on the difference 
between choice of the PICC as applicable law and their incorporation into the contract, 
the practical differences between these different ways of choosing the PICC are actually 
small.90 These differences concern these issues in particular: fi rst, the role of internally 
mandatory norms of the otherwise applicable law (Art 1.4—see para 41 below);91 second, 
the potential applicability of norms governing standard terms to the PICC (see para 34 
above); third, the interpretation of the PICC as law or as contract terms according to the 
standards of an otherwise applicable law (see para 39 below). Whether the PICC can be 
chosen as applicable law is determined by the choice of law norms of the forum alone 
(unlike in Art 1:103 PECL), whereas whether they can be incorporated into the contract 
is determined by the law determined through the ordinary choice of law process.
(b) Effects of choice
Choice of the PICC, in whichever way, has both an including and an excluding effect: to 
select them as applicable, and to deselect other rules that would otherwise apply. Although 
both effects are usually treated together and the processes of applying one rule and not 
applying another often go hand in hand, both aspects present different kinds of problem 
and therefore benefi t from separate treatment.
(1) Selection of the PICC. The including effect of a choice of the PICC is to make them 
applicable. Application is largely unproblematic, regardless of whether the PICC are 
chosen as applicable law or are incorporated into the contract. Very few of the rules of 
the PICC are actually incompatible with rules at least of Western domestic contract law, 
a consequence of the strong infl uence Western systems had in the drafting (see para 16 
above). Exceptions can arise, though, especially with non-Western systems.
How the PICC are chosen can impact their judicial interpretation. Some provisions in the 
PICC are quite generally phrased (in particular the good faith provision in Art 1.7). This 
89 B Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘Les contrats du commerce international, une approche nouvelle: Les Principes 
d’UNIDROIT relatifs aux contrats du commerce international’ [1998] RIDC 463, 477–478.
90 C Hultmark, ‘UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts som alternativ till 
lagvalsklausl’ in Festskrift till Jan Sandström (1997) 253, 257; J Samtleben, ‘Versuch über die Konvention 
von Mexiko über das auf internationale Schuldverträge anwendbare Recht’ [1998] IPRax 385, 390–391; 
JP Beraudo, ‘Faut-il avoir peur du contrat sans loi?’ in Le droit international privé: esprit et méthodes – Mélanges 
en l’honneur de Paul Lagarde (2005) 93, 109–110; GP Romano, ‘Le choix des Principes UNIDROIT par les 
contractants à l’épreuve des dispositions impératives’ in E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT 
Principles 2004: Their Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 35–54; (2006) 
Study L – Misc 25, para 22 (Goode).
91 Viewed as the only relevant difference by F Vischer, ‘Die kollisionsrechtliche Bedeutung der Wahl einer 
nichtstaatlichen Ordnung für den staatlichen Richter am Beispiel der UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts’ in I Schwenzer and G Hager (eds), Festschrift für Peter Schlechtriem (2003) 445, 448; 
WH Roth, ‘Zur Wählbarkeit nichtstaatlichen Rechts’ in HP Mansel et al (eds), Festschrift für Erik Jayme, vol I 
(2004) 757, 759.
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does not create a problem where the PICC are chosen as applicable law, because then their 
construction is similar to other construction problems in domestic law, and it does not 
normally present a problem in arbitration. Their incorporation into the contract, however, 
may create a problem in legal systems, especially common law systems, where judges are 
unwilling to be very creative in the construction of vague contract terms.92
(2) Deselecting rules of otherwise applicable law. A potentially bigger problem concerns 
the excluding effect of selecting the PICC: the deselection of otherwise applicable rules 
of domestic law. Because the PICC are not a fully-fl edged codifi cation, they can never 
derogate an otherwise applicable law in the areas which they do not cover. This is 
undisputed for areas outside contract law and to those areas within contract law that have 
not yet been codifi ed in the PICC or that are explicitly excluded.93 It is hard to say in the 
abstract whether it is also true for domestic rules that are more specifi c than the rules in 
the PICC; but where both sets of rules are compatible, it seems advisable to resort to the 
more detailed domestic rules.
Even within the areas covered by the PICC, deselection of domestic law is only partial. All 
mandatory norms of the domestic law remain applicable for choice of the PICC if the 
PICC are merely integrated into the contract (see para 33 above)94 or if the contract is purely 
local.95 By contrast, if the PICC are validly chosen as applicable law (see para 32 above), 
only internationally mandatory norms (norms that apply regardless of the otherwise applic-
able law) remain applicable; purely internally mandatory norms are displaced, at least if 
interpretation of the PICC suggests that they supersede norms in that particular area.96 
Whether a norm is internally or internationally mandatory is determined by interpretation 
of that norm and the applicable choice of law norms.97
Selection of the PICC should not automatically be read as deselection of the CISG or other 
uniform law.98 If the choice of the PICC is invalid under existing choice of law rules, this 
choice should not be viewed as a deselection of the CISG (under its Art 6), because applica-
tion of the CISG is then likely to be in tune with the parties’ intentions. Yet even where 
the choice of the PICC as applicable law is valid, it would normally seem inadequate to 
interpret the choice of the PICC as a deselection of the CISG. To the extent that the CISG 
92 For English law see Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals [2004] EWCA Civ 19, [2004] 1 
WLR 1784 [52], QB (unwillingness to interpret Shari’ah); J Hill, International Commercial Disputes in English 
Courts (3rd edn, 2005) 470–471.
93 A Giardina, ‘I Principi UNIDROIT quale legge regolatrice dei contratti internazionali (I Principi ed il 
diritto internazionale private)’ in MJ Bonell and F Bonelli (eds), Contratti commerciali internazionali e Principi 
UNIDROIT (1997) 55, 67–69; A Prujiner, ‘Comment utiliser les Principes d’UNIDROIT dans la pratique 
contractuelle’ (2002) 36 RJT 561, 568–572. 
94 Off Cmt 2 to Art 1.4, p 12; see below, Art 1.4 para 4.
95 For Europe, see Art 3(3) of the Rome I Regulation (n 56 above) and Romano (n 90 above) 50; for the 
USA, see § 187(1) Restatement 2d Confl ict of Laws; cf PH Glenn, ‘International Private Law of Contract’ in L 
Pereznieto Castro et al (eds), International Law at the Beginning of the Third Millennium: Liber in Memoriam of 
Professor Friedrich K Juenger (2006) 53, 64.
96 Off Cmt 3 to Art 1.4, pp 12–13; see below, Art 1.4 para 4.
97 Art 9 of the Rome I Regulation (n 56 above).
98 Prujiner (n 93 above) 573–575; Bonell (n 9 above) 317.
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contains more specifi c rules for international sales contracts than the PICC, one can assume 
the parties would want these rules to supplement the PICC.99
(3) Personal scope of choice. In some parts, the PICC, since their second edition in 2004, 
go beyond the model of two-party relations that is traditionally characteristic of contract 
law. This is true for the provisions on agency (Section 2.2), on contracts for the benefi t 
of third parties (Section 5.2), and on the assignment of rights and transfer of obligations 
(Sections 9.1–9.3). However, these three- (or more) party relations can be split up into 
separate partial solutions, and applicability of the PICC can and must be determined for 
each two-party relationship.100 For example, the question of whether the PICC apply 
must be answered separately (and may, in fact, fi nd different answers) for the relationship 
between a principal and its agent, between the principal and another party, and between 
the agent and the other party.101 Where an obligation governed by the PICC is transferred, 
it remains governed by the PICC even if the transfer itself is governed by some other law. 
Similarly, if an obligation governed by some other law is transferred according to Chapter 
9 of the PICC, the transferred obligation itself remains governed by the other law.
(4) Intertemporal applicability: the applicable edition of the PICC. Since the 1994 and 
2004 editions of the PICC are different, the question can arise of which version applies. 
The answer is clear if the parties, as is recommended, explicitly determine which version 
they select. The situation is more complicated if the parties have chosen the PICC without 
designating a version. If the choice is made after 2004, it can be presumed to be the 2004 
edition of the PICC.102 If the choice was made earlier, the issue arises whether the choice 
is a dynamic one (designating the PICC in whatever version is current at the time of 
dispute) or a static one (designating the PICC in the state in which they are at the time of 
choice). The traditional solution in choice of law is to read party choice as dynamic, going 
to the version in force at the time of adjudication. The same solution should apply when 
the PICC are chosen as applicable law.103 But the solution appears correct even when the 
PICC are merely incorporated into the contract within the framework of an otherwise 
applicable contract law. Although the content of a contract is usually fi xed at the time 
when it is made, freedom of contract allows parties to refer dynamically to norms lying 
outside the contract, and this seems especially appropriate with regard to the PICC (given 
that it was always known they would be revised). However, where a change would lead to 
the frustration of the parties’ legitimate expectations, these expectations must prevail over 
the application of the new edition of the PICC.
(c) Choice of law clause
Altogether, freedom to choose the PICC as applicable law seems desirable (though so far 
rarely exercised, at least outside of arbitration),104 but their choice as applicable law neces-
99 Bonell (n 9 above) 317.
100 ibid 80; see also Off Cmt 3 to Art 1.3, p 11.
101 See below, Art 2.2.1 para 14.
102 Centro de Arbitraje de México 30 November 2006, Unilex.
103 J Kondring, ‘Nichtstaatliches Recht als Vertragsstatut vor staatlichen Gerichten – oder: Privatkodifi kationen 
in der Abseitsfalle?’ [2007] IPRax 241, 244.
104 See only (2006) Study L – Misc 25, para 22 (Chappuis).
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sarily remains incomplete.105 First, the PICC are still incomplete even within general con-
tract law (see para 40 above), so any choice must be supplemented with that of a domestic 
law. Second, the PICC contain no rules for specifi c contract types (see para 17 above), so 
they need to be supplemented by some other, often domestic, law. Third, the PICC contain 
almost exclusively non-mandatory norms, so mandatory norms will still be derived from 
offi cial law as determined by choice of law rules (Art 1.4; see para 41 above). This means 
that even where the PICC can be chosen as applicable law, a supplemental domestic law 
must be determined. This choice of law takes place under the applicable rules of choice and 
can therefore be based either on a supplemental choice by the parties or, where such a choice 
is absent or invalid, on the basis of objective connecting factors.106
Following approval by the Governing Council in 1999,107 the PICC provide an offi cial foot-
note with two suggested texts for choice of law clauses, formulated by Professor Farnsworth.108 
The fi rst of these model clauses appears inadequate, because parties choosing the PICC will 
regularly want to minimize uncertainty and determine a supplemental law for areas not cov-
ered by the PICC. The second model clause is better in this respect, but it does not account for 
the possibility of choosing international Conventions instead of, or in addition to, domestic 
law.109 A proper model clause must achieve completeness by providing applicable norms for all 
circumstances. In addition, it must determine the hierarchy between the sources.
Model contracts provide better models in this regard.110 A good model clause, accounting 
for both the strengths and the incompleteness of the PICC, can be found in Art 14 of the 
1999 ITC Model Contract for the International Sale of Perishable Goods:111
‘In so far as any matters are not covered by the foregoing provisions, this Contract is  governed 
by the following, in descending order of precedence:
– The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
– The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, and
– For matters not dealt with in the above-mentioned texts, the law applicable at ______ 
or, in the absence of a choice of law, the law applicable at the Seller’s place of business 
through which this Contract is to be performed.’
105 H Raeschke-Kaessler, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles in Contemporary Contract Practice’ [2002] ICC Int’l 
Ct Arb Bull, Special suppl 99, 99–100.
106 See also para 51 below.
107 (1999) CD 78 (23); dates changed (from the 1994 edition of the PICC to the 2004 edition of the PICC) 
in (2003) Study L – Doc 85, p 1 (section I A).
108 (1998) Study L – Doc 57; see the debate in (1999) Study L – Misc 21 paras 4–17.
109 Although under current choice of law rules international Conventions cannot normally be selected 
outside their normal scope of application, it seems safe to assume that a choice of law regime that allows choice 
of the PICC also allows for the choice of international Conventions.
110 A Mourre and E Jolivet, ‘La réception des Principes d’UNIDROIT dans les contrats modèles de la 
Chambre de Commerce Internationale’ [2004] ULR 275, 289–293.
111 International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO, International Commercial Sale of Perishable Goods: Model 
Contract and Users’ Guide (1999) (www.jurisint.org/en/con/339.html). For other clauses, see Kronke (n 3 above) 
453–454; F Bortolotti, ‘Reference to the UNIDROIT Principles in Contract Practice and Model Contracts’ 
[2005] ICC Int’l Ct Arb Bull, Special suppl 57, 61–64; MJ Bonell, ‘UNIDROIT Principles 2004: The New 
Edition of the Principles of International Commercial Contracts adopted by the International Institute for the 
Unifi cation of Private Law’ [2004] ULR 5, 11.
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This model can easily be adapted, both for other types of contracts (for which the CISG 
is less appropriate) and for other criteria to designate the applicable domestic law. Also, 
parties may want to give the PICC precedence over the CISG on the basis that some rules 
of the PICC are more specifi c and/or represent improvements over those of the 
CISG.112
(d) Solutions under existing legal regimes
(1) General comparative results. Although the question of whether the PICC can be the 
applicable law must be answered separately for each legal system, some general insights 
arise from comparing their approaches. First, there is some consistency in statutory 
interpretation of choice of law rules. Where choice of law rules designate the ‘law of a 
state’, this is universally and appropriately read to exclude the PICC. Where choice of 
law rules designate ‘rules of law’ as applicable, this is frequently read as an indicator that 
the PICC can be included; especially in the context of arbitration.113 Where, fi nally, 
choice of law rules simply speak of ‘the law’, mere textual analysis is of little help: 
whether law in this sense includes the PICC must be answered through arguments of 
drafting history, systematic context, and purposes. The substantive characteristics and 
purposes of the PICC can become relevant especially for the purposes of such a choice 
of law rule.
Second, comparison shows that almost all state legal orders reject application of the PICC 
as law by confi ning the status of ‘applicable law’ to state law, whether as selected law within 
the scope of party autonomy or as objectively applicable law in the absence of a choice. 
Traditional choice of law mediates between the legal orders of states, and states are unwill-
ing to give up the traditional state-based concept of law.114 The situation is different in 
arbitration, where applicability of the PICC is more widely accepted.115 Views amongst 
academics are split. Much of the discussion is devoted to whether the PICC can become the 
applicable law on the basis of a choice by the parties; their use as applicable law absent a 
choice by the parties is not yet suffi ciently established, although such use seems much more 
in tune with their purposes and character.116
(2) European Union. Until recently, courts in EU member states determined the 
applicable contract law under the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome Convention).117 Its Art 3 allows the parties to choose the applicable 
‘law’. Choice of the PICC as applicable law is thus excluded.118 Despite occasional claims 
112 Prujiner (n 93 above) 573–575.
113 See below, Preamble II para 3.
114 For explication, see Michaels (n 84 above) 1241–1249.
115 See below, Preamble II para 3.
116 See para 10 above and paras 67–80 below.
117 EC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome Convention) [1998] OJ 
C 27/34.
118 Although no court decision is directly on point with regard to the PICC, at least one decision suggests 
this in an obiter dictum when rejecting the eligibility of other non-state laws: Tribunale di Padova, Sezione 
di Este 11 January 2005, Unilex (choice of ICC rules); for discussion, see M Luby and S Poillot-Peruzzetto, 
‘Chronique: Droit international et européen’ [2006] JCP 157; F Ferrari, Contract with no governing law in private 
international and non-state law: Italian Report to the 17th Congress of the International Academy of Comparative 
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to the contrary,119 this follows quite clearly from a traditional interpretation of the Rome 
Convention, especially the history of the provisions (non-state law was not considered)120 
and the system of the Convention (other provisions make clear that the Convention 
is restricted to state law).121 The distinction between state law and non-state law rests 
on rational criteria (regardless of whether one agrees with them) and therefore does not 
Law (2006, unpublished) 4–5. For another decision rejecting choice of non-state law, see the English case of 
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals [2004] EWCA Civ 19, [2004] 1 WLR 1784 [48], QB 
(Shari’ah, lex mercatoria, ‘general principles of law’). Literature on the question is vast. This note collects only 
authors addressing the PICC specifi cally, ordered by national origin (although EU law should apply uniformly) 
because of existing differences in perspective. For Belgian views see M Fontaine, ‘Belgium’ in MJ Bonell (ed), 
A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (1999) 55, 62. For Dutch views see L Strikwerda, Inleidinge tot het nederlandse international privaatrecht 
(2005) 177–178. For English views see M Bridge, ‘The UK Sale of Goods Act, the CISG and the UNIDROIT 
Principles’ in P Šarcevic and P Volken (eds), The International Sale of Goods Revisited (2001) 115, 143; R Goode, 
‘International Restatements and National Law’ in W Swadling and G Jones (eds), The Search for Principle: Essays 
in Honour of Lord Goff of Chievely (1999) 45, 49–51; L Collins (ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Confl ict of 
Laws (14th edn, 2006) para 32-081; CMV Clarkson and J Hill, The Confl ict of Laws (3rd edn, 2006) 176. For 
French views see P Lagarde, ‘Le nouveau droit international privé des contrats après l’entrée en vigueur de la 
Convention de Rome du 19 juin 1980’ [1980] Rev crit dr int privé 287, 300–301; C Larroumet, ‘La valeur des 
principes d’UNIDROIT applicables aux contrats du commerce international’ [1997] JCP 147, 149; P Mayer 
and V Heuzé, Droit international privé (8th edn, 2004) para 703. For German views see U Drobnig, ‘The 
UNIDROIT Principles in the Confl ict of Laws’ [1998] ULR 385, 388; J Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht 
(6th edn, 2006) 465; Michaels (n 4 above) 397–398; Teichert (n 4 above) 133–190. For Italian views see U 
Villani, La Convenzione di Roma sulla legge applicabile ai contratti (2nd edn, 2002) 81. For Spanish views see PA 
de Miguel Asensio, ‘Armonización normativa y régimen jurídico de los contratos mercantiles internacionales’ 
(1998) 12 Dir comm int 859, 875, 877. For Swedish views see C Hultmark, ‘Sweden’ in MJ Bonell (ed), A New 
Approach to International Commercial Contracts: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(1999) 307; Hultmark (n 90 above) 256; M Bogdan, Svensk internationell privat- och processretten (6th edn, 
2004) 237–238.
119 For Dutch views see K Boele-Woelki, ‘Principles and Private International Law: The UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law – How to 
Apply them to International Contracts’ [1996] ULR 652, 665; F de Ly, ‘Choice of law clauses, UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts and Article 3 Rome Convention: The lex mercatoria 
before domestic courts or arbitration privilege?’ in Études offertes à Barthélemy Mercadal (2002) 133, 143; A 
Hartkamp, ‘The Use of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts by National and 
Supranational Courts’ in Institute of International Business Law and Practice (ed), UNIDROIT Principles for 
International Commercial Contracts: A New Lex Mercatoria? (ICC publication no 490/1) (1995) 253, 256.
For German views see J Basedow, ‘Germany’ in MJ Bonell (ed), A New Approach to International Commercial 
Contracts: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1999) 125, 146–147; S Leible, 
‘Aussenhandel und Rechtssicherheit’ (1998) 97 ZvglRWiss 286, 313–318; Roth (n 91 above) 768–771; 
Schilf (n 31 above) 371–372; JC Wichard, ‘Die Anwendung der UNIDROIT-Prinzipien für internationale 
Handelsverträge durch Schiedsgerichte und staatliche Gerichte’ (1996) 60 RabelsZ 269, 282–290. For French 
views, see Ancel (n 21 above). See also B Audit, Droit international privé (4th edn, 2006) para 821; Vischer (n 
91 above) 451–452.
120 Lagarde (n 118 above); Teichert (n 4 above) 152–154. For views against relevance of the historical 
argument, see Hartkamp (n 119 above) 256; Schilf (n 31 above) 362.
121 Especially Art 1(1) of the Rome Convention (n 56 above): ‘The rules of this Convention shall apply 
to contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different countries’ (emphasis 
added). See detailed discussion in Schilf (n 31 above) 364–371; Teichert (n 4 above) 141–152.
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violate principles of non-discrimination.122 Neither the substantive quality of the PICC123 
nor their formal character as (legal or quasi-legal) norms124 requires the legislator to treat 
them as eligible law. Likewise, even if the EU Treaty125 should require states to accept 
party autonomy (in itself a doubtful proposition), the logic of EU law would still support 
a choice only between the laws of the EU member states, and not that of third country 
laws, much less that of non-state law.126
The same is true, after much debate, under the new law. In a Green Book of 2003, the 
European Commission had considered enabling parties to choose ‘general principles of law’ 
as applicable law.127 Reactions were mixed: many academics were positive,128 professional 
associations and practitioners were by and large more hesitant. A 2005 proposal for a new 
Regulation provided, in the fi rst sentence of its Art 3(2), that ‘[t]he parties may also choose 
as the applicable law the principles and rules of the substantive law of contract recognized 
122 See Michaels (n 84 above) 1237–1249; cf most recently Schinkels (n 83 above) 111.
123 AM López-Rodríguez, ‘The Revision of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations: A Crucial Role within the European Contract Law Project?’ (2003) 72 Nordic Journal 
of International Law 341, 351–354 (with references).
124 Schinkels (n 83 above) 108, 111. 
125 Treaty on European Union of 29 July 1992, [1992] OJ C 191.
126 Roth (n 91 above) 760; A Tassikas, Dispositives Recht und Rechtswahlfreiheit als Ausnahmebereiche 
der Grundfreiheiten (2004) 22–23; cf S Grundmann, Europäisches Schuldvertragsrecht (1999) 74 para 101; 
S Grundmann, ‘Law merchant als lex lata Communitatis: insbesondere die UNIDROIT-Principles’ in U 
Diederichsen et al (eds), Festschrift für Walter Rolland zum 70: Geburtstag (1999) 145; B Ancel and HM 
Watt, ‘The Relevance of Substantive International Commercial Norms for Choice of Law in Contract: 
the Rome and Mexico City Conventions Compared’ in L Pereznieto Castro et al (eds), International 
Law at the Beginning of the Third Millennium: Liber in Memoriam of Professor Friedrich K Juenger (2006) 
1, 21–22. See also P Wilmowsky, ‘EG-Vertrag und kollisionsrechtliche Rechtswahlfreiheit’ (1998) 62 
RabelsZ 1.
127 Green Paper on the Conversion of the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernisation of 14 January 2003, COM (2002) 654 
fi nal, Question 8 and Comment 3.2.3 (pp 23–24) (based on the empirically doubtful assumption that such 
references to non-state law are ‘common practice in international trade’).
128 eg Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law, ‘Comments on the 
European Commission’s Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernization’ (2004) 68 
RabelsZ 1, 32–33; Beraudo (n 90 above) 102–105; P Mankowski and U Magnus, ‘The Green Paper on a 
Future Rome I Regulation: On the Road to a Renewed European Private International Law of Contracts’ 
(2004) 103 ZvglRWiss 131; JL Neels and EA Fredericks, ‘Revision of the Rome Convention on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (1980): Perspectives from international commercial and fi nancial 
law’ [2004] EUREDIA: Revue européene de droit bancier et fi nancier 173, 175–178; López-Rodríguez 
(n 110 above); JP Beraudo, ‘La modernisation et l’harmonisation du droit des contrats: une perspective 
européenne’ [2003] ULR 135, 137–138; Bonell (n 8 above) 190; Teichert (n 4 above) 195–224. All of 
the reactions are available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/news_
summary_rome1_en.htm.
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internationally or in the Community’.129 However, that provision was not adopted in the 
fi nal version of the Regulation.130
Should the European legislator want to allow parties to choose the PICC in the future, the 
text of draft Art 3(2) may need to be reformulated. Although its text made it clear that the 
general lex mercatoria should be excluded and the PICC should be included, the specifi c 
requirement of international recognition is diffi cult to defi ne.131 It seems necessary to 
confi ne it to rules that have been widely recognized by adjudicators and/or important inter-
national institutions, especially UNCITRAL.132 Some propose substantive quality as an 
alternative criterion.133 But this criterion (which the PICC would meet) would create con-
siderable uncertainty and is not part of the text. Nor is it a requirement for the application 
of foreign state law, which can become applicable regardless of its substantive quality.
As regards gaps within the PICC, the second sentence of draft Art 3(2) provided, like 
Art 7(2) CISG, that ‘questions relating to matters governed by such principles or rules 
which are not expressly settled by them shall be governed by the general principles underly-
ing them or, failing such principles, in accordance with the law applicable in the absence of 
a choice under this Regulation’. Properly understood, the fi rst part is in accordance with 
Art 1.6(2) PICC, and the second part clarifi es the need to determine a supplemental law 
(see para 45 above). Although the text of draft Art 3(2) could be read to suggest otherwise,134 
there can be little doubt that parties can (and should—see paras 45–47 above) select this 
supplemental law.
129 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 fi nal (15 December 2005) p 5. See de Ly (n 119 above); 
B Jud, ‘Neue Dimensionen privatautonomer Rechtswahl: Die Wahl nichtstaatlichen Rechts im Entwurf der 
Rom I-Verordnung’ [2006] JBl 695; P Mankowski, ‘Stillschweigende Rechtswahl und wählbares Recht’ in 
S Leible (ed), Das Grünbuch zum Internationalen Vertragsrecht: Beiträge zur Fortentwicklung der vertraglichen 
Schuldverhältnisse (2004) 63, 86–103; F Schäfer, ‘Die Wahl nichtstaatlichen Rechts nach Art 3 Abs 2 des 
Entwurfs einer Rom I VO: Auswirkungen auf das optionale Instrument des europäischen Vertragsrechts’ 
(2006) 3 GPR 54; Schinkels (n 83 above); O Toth, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts as the Governing Law: Refl ections in Light of the Reform of the Rome Convention’ in E Cashin 
Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence 
and Codifi cation (2007) 201; C Fountoulakis, ‘The Parties’ Choice of “Neutral Law” in International Sales 
Contracts’ (2005) 7 EJLR 303, 324; S James, ‘Time to Slice and Dice in the Contractual Kitchen?’ in R 
Schulze (ed), New Features in Contract Law (2007) 299, 305–310; Kondring (n 103 above) 245; H Heiss, 
‘Die Vergemeinschaftung des internationalen Vertragsrechts durch “Rom I” und ihre Auswirkungen auf das 
österreichische internationale Privatrecht’ [2006] JBl 750, 758–759; P Lagarde, ‘Remarques sur la proposition 
de règlement de la Commission européenne sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles (Rome I)’ [2006] 
Rev crit dr int privé 331, 335–336; P Mankowski, ‘Der Vorschlag für die Rom I-Verordnung’ [2006] IPRax 
101, 102; F Marella, ‘Prime note circa la scelta del diritto applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali nella proposta 
di regolamento “Roma I”’ in P Franzina (ed), La legge applicabile ai contratti nella proposta di regolamento ‘Roma 
I’ (2006) 28, 35–39; MR McGuire, ‘Die geplante Umwandlung des EVÜ in die Rom I-VO’ [2006] ecolex 444; 
M Schmidt-Kessel, ‘Neues aus Brüssel’ (2006) 3 GPR 47.
130 Art 3 of the Rome I Regulation (n 56 above). 
131 Discussed by Jud (n 129 above) 698–701. 
132 See para 102 below.
133 Jud (n 129 above) 701–704 sets out these criteria: balanced content, neutrality of drafters, specifi city, 
completeness, and publicity.
134 Toth (n 129 above) 207.
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(3) Other European countries. In European countries where the Rome I Regulation135 
does not apply, the answer must be found in domestic choice of law rules. The situation 
in Switzerland was long unclear. Art 116 of the 1987 Swiss Confl ict of Laws Act only 
refers to the chosen law, without explicit restriction to state law.136 Based on views in the 
literature advocating eligibility of the PICC and other non-state law,137 the Commercial 
Court of St Gallen held in 2004 that the FIFA rules could be chosen as applicable law 
like the PICC.138 The Federal Court overruled this decision with regard to the FIFA 
rules based on two considerations: codifi cations established by private organizations are 
subordinated to state law, and the FIFA rules themselves accept this subordination.139 
Although both arguments do not apply directly to the PICC, they make it unlikely that 
the Federal Court would reach a different decision with regard to the PICC.140
Other countries apparently take no position at all or a similarly negative one. This is so, for 
example, in Croatia141 and presumably for Serbia and Montenegro,142 as well as various 
new EU member states before their entry into the EU: they include Hungary,143 the Czech 
Republic,144 and Romania.145 A similar result holds, at least in effect, in Norway, which 
follows the Rome Convention in this regard.146
(4) North America. Choice of law in the USA is not unifi ed; different states take different 
methodological approaches.147 Some scholars have proposed allowing the choice of the 
135 n 56 above.
136 Bundesgesetz über das internationale Privatrecht (English translation at www.umbricht.ch/pdf/SwissPIL.
pdf ).
137 M Amstutz, NP Vogt, and M Wang, Kommentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht (1996) Art 116 para 21; 
F Vischer, L Huber, and D Oser, Internationales Vertragsrecht (2nd edn, 2000) 66; F Vischer‚ ‘The Relevance 
of the UNIDROIT Principles for Judges and Arbitrators in Disputes Arising out of International Contracts’ 
(1998–1999) 1 EJLR 203, 212; Vischer (n 91 above) 451–452; cf K Siehr, Das internationale Privatrecht der 
Schweiz (2002) 232; U Portmann, ‘Alles was Recht ist: Die Rechtswahl der UNIDROIT-Prinzipien und deren 
Lückenfüllung im schweizerischen IPRG’ in E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 
2004: Their Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 191; I Schwander, ‘Der 
“contrat sans loi” und das nichtstaatliche Recht im Internationalen Privatrecht’ in Swiss Reports Presented at the 
XVIIth Congress of Comparative Law (2006) 117.
138 Handelsgericht St Gallen 12 November 2004, Unilex.
139 DFT 20 December 2005, 132/2005 III 285, Unilex with notes by Ivo Schwander [2006] AJP 615; 
Kondring (n 103 above).
140 Portmann (n 137 above) 199–200; Schwander (n 137 above).
141 M Župan, Croatian National Report: Contracts with no governing law in private international law and Non-
State law – Report for the 17th Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law (2006, unpublished) 7. 
142 M Stanivukovic, Contracts without a proper law in private international law and non-state law in Serbia 
and Montenegro Law – Report for the 17th Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law (2006, 
unpublished) 5–6, see also p 9 (for the law of Serbia and Montenegro, but presumably this also applies to the 
successor states). 
143 G Palasti, Contracts with no governing law in private international law and Non-State law: Hungarian 
Report (2006, unpublished) 2.
144 M Pauknerová, Contracts with no governing law in private international law and Non-State law: Czech 
Report (2006, unpublished) 3.
145 PM Cosmovici and R Munteanu, ‘Romania’ in MJ Bonell (ed), A New Approach to International 
Commercial Contracts: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1999) 281, 292.
146 LM Heggberget and E Nyland, ‘Formulering av Internasjonale Kontraktsrettlige Grunnprinzipper og 
Betydningen for Norsk Rett’ (2002) 115 Tidskrift for Rettsvitenskap 252, 282.
147 EF Scoles, P Hay, PJ Borchers and SC Symeonides, Confl ict of Laws (4th edn, 2004) chapter 18.II.
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PICC generally in the USA,148 but so far to little avail. Currently, eligibility of the PICC 
as applicable law is almost universally rejected in the common law systems of the USA.149 
Twenty-four states follow the Restatement 2d Confl ict of Laws, which, in its § 187(2), 
allows the parties to choose the applicable law. However, this choice is confi ned to the 
law of a state.150 Only incorporation of the PICC into the contract (see para 33 above) is 
possible under § 187(1).151 The same is true under the UCC. Its old § 1-105 allows only 
for choice of the law of a state with some connections, making it impossible to choose 
the PICC as applicable law. The new § 1-301, introduced in 2001 but retracted in 2008, 
would have given up the requirement of a close connection (and has, for this reason, been 
adopted merely by a small number of states) but still confi ned choice to the law of a state. 
Choice of non-state law was discussed but rejected.152 It follows that the PICC can only be 
incorporated into the substance of the contract under § 1-302 UCC (USA),153 a decision 
that holds despite occasional criticism in the literature.154
The situation in states with codifi ed choice of law rules is different. The Louisiana codifi ca-
tion is unclear: Art 3540 Lousiana Cc allows for the choice of a ‘law’ without explicit restric-
tion to state law, and the main academic drafter of the codifi cation considers applicability 
of the PICC possible.155 More clarity exists in Oregon, where the PICC can be chosen under 
the 2001 Codifi cation of Choice of Law for Contracts.156 A comment to Art 120, which 
allows parties to choose the applicable ‘law’, says explicitly: ‘In exercising this autonomy, 
parties may select model rules or principles. For example, parties to an international con-
tract may choose to have it governed by the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts’.157 No pertinent case is known.
148 PJ Borchers, ‘The Internationalization of Contractual Confl icts Law’ (1995) 28 Vand J Transnat’l L 421, 
438.
149 Trans Meridian Trading Inc v Empresa Nacional de Comerzialicion de Insumos 829 F 2d 949, 953–954 (9th 
Cir 1987): choice of UCP 500.
150 SC Symeonides, ‘Contracts Subject to Non-State Norms’ (2006) 54 Am J Comp L, Suppl 209, 217.
151 RJ Weintraub, ‘Lex Mercatoria and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts’ 
in PJ Borchers and J Zekoll (eds), International Confl ict of Laws for the Third Millennium: Essays in Honor of 
Friedrich K Juenger (2001) 141, 153; Symeonides (n 150 above) 216–217.
152 ALI, Uniform Commercial Code. Revised Article 1. General Provisions, Members Consultative Group 
Draft (Feb 28, 2000) 24–25, cited after Bonell (n 9 above) 187 n 40.
153 § 1-302 Cmt 2 UCC (USA); Bonell (n 9 above) 186–188; FK Juenger, ‘Some Random Remarks from 
Overseas’ in KP Berger (ed), The Practice of Transnational Law (2001) 81, 87–88; SH Jenkins, ‘Contracting 
Out of Article 2: Minimizing the Obligation of Performance and Liability for Breach’ (2006) 40 Loy LA LRev 
401, 402–405.
154 JM Graves, ‘Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The Failure of Revised UCC § 1-301 and a 
Proposal for Broader Reform’ (2005) 36 Seton Hall Law Review 59.
155 Symeonides (n 150 above) 221–222.
156 Oregon Revised Statutes 81.100–135 (2001); JAR Nafziger, ‘Oregon’s Confl icts Law Applicable to 
Contracts’ (2002) 38 Willamette Law Review 397, 400, 403; SC Symeonides, ‘Codifying Choice of Law for 
Contracts: The Oregon Experience’ (2003) 67 RabelsZ 726, 738; Symeonides (n 150 above) 221; S Symeonides, 
‘Oregon’s Choice-of-Law Codifi cation for Contract Confl ict: An Exegesis’ (2007) 44 Willamette Law Review 
205, 228.
157 Comments (to the Bill underlying the legislation), Section 7 Cmt 3, printed as Annex III in Nafziger 
(n 156 above) 419, 421. 
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In Canada, the question is rarely discussed; where it is, choice of the PICC as applicable law 
is excluded.158
(5) Latin America. Latin American legal systems have traditionally been sceptical of 
party autonomy in choice of law.159 This changed somewhat with the Inter-American 
Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts of 1994 (‘Inter-American 
Convention’),160 which provides in its Art 7(1)(1): ‘The contract shall be governed by the 
law chosen by the parties’. Although many scholars have argued that ‘law’ must be read 
to include non-state law like the PICC,161 it appears more plausible that their choice is 
excluded.162 Traditionally, in the Latin American context ‘law’ refers to offi cial law; the 
eligibility of non-offi cial law would need to be more express. This is so even though the 
Spanish version speaks of derecho rather than ley (unlike, for example, the Spanish version 
of the Rome I Regulation).163 The reason is a systematic one: while Art 9(2)(2) of the 
Inter-American Convention explicitly requires the judge to look also to ‘general principles 
of . . . law’ when the parties have not chosen a law,164 Art 7 of the Convention does not 
contain a similar expression.
158 For Québec, see JA Talpis, ‘Retour vers le futur: application en droit québécois des Principes d’UNIDROIT 
au lieu d’une loi nationale’ (2002) 36 RJT 608, 616 (with critique of this result at pp 618–621); cf Glenn (n 95 
above) 62–63. 
159 See A Boggiano, ‘The Contribution of the Hague Conference to the Development of Private International 
Law in Latin America: Universality and Genius Loci’ (1992–II) 233 Recueil des Cours 99, 132–134; CF 
de Aguirre, La autonomia de la voluntad en la contratación internacional (1991); S Rippe, ‘Problemas de 
derecho internacional privado en materia de contratos comerciales internacionales, con especial referencia a la 
aplicabilidad imperativa de los principios del proyecto UNIDROIT en los estados partes del MERCOSUR’ 
in MJ Bonell and S Schipani (eds), ‘Principi per i contratti commerciali internazionali’ e il sistema giuridico 
latinoamericano (1996) 51, 53–56; N de Araujo, Contratos Internacionais: Autonomia de Vontade, Mercosul e 
Convenções Internacionais (3rd edn, 2004) 91–129 (Brazil), 77–90 (other MERCOSUR member states).
160 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts (Mexico, 17 March 
1994).
161 FK Juenger, ‘The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts; 
Some Highlights and Comparisons’ (1994) 42 Am J Comp L 381, 392; FK Juenger, ‘Contract Choice of 
Law in the Americas’ (1997) 45 Am J Comp L 195, 204; G Parra-Aranguren, ‘The Fifth Inter-American 
Specialized Conference on Private International Law, Mexico City, 14–18 March, 1994’ in A Borrás et al 
(eds), E Pluribus Unum: Liber Amicorum Georges AL Droz (1996) 299, 308; JL Siqueiros, ‘Los Principios de 
UNIDROIT y la Convención Interamericana sobre el derecho aplicable a los contratos internacionales’ in 
Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas (ed), Contratación internacional: Comentarios a Los Principios sobre los 
Contratos Comerciales Internacionales del UNIDROIT (1998) 217, 227; for a constitutional argument, see L 
da Gama e Souza jr, Contratos Internacionais à luz dos Princìpios do UNIDROIT 2004: Soft Law, Arbitragem e 
Jurisdicao (2006) 434–438; for extensive discussion, see Schilf (n 31 above) 347–359.
162 A Boggiano, ‘La Convention interaméricaine sur la loi applicable aux contrats internationaux et les 
Principes d’UNIDROIT’ [1996] ULR 219, 226; R Herbert, ‘La Convención Interamericana sobre Derecho 
Aplicable a los Contratos Internacionales’ (1994) Revista Uruguaya de derecho internacional privado 45, 54; 
da Gama e Souza jr (n 161 above) 432; DP Fernández Arroyo, ‘La Convention inter-américaine sur la loi 
applicable aux contrats internationaux: certains chemins conduisent au-delà de Rome’ [1995] Rev crit dr int 
privé 178, 182–183; also O Lando, ‘Some Issues Relating to the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ 
(1996) 7 King’s College Law Journal 55, 63; MN Lamm, Die Interamerikanischen Spezialkonferenzen für 
Internationales Privatrecht (2000) 268; DP Fernández Arroyo (ed), Derecho Internacional Privado de los Estados 
del Mercosur (2003) 996–1006.
163 Beraudo (n 90 above) 106. For the Rome Regulation, see n 56 above.
164 See para 75 below.
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The question is largely irrelevant in practice, since so far only Mexico and Venezuela have 
ratifi ed the Inter-American Convention.165 Mexico allows party autonomy, but whether it 
extends to the PICC is unclear.166 Venezuela has adopted Art 7 of the Inter-American 
Convention in Art 29 of its 1998 Private International Law Act;167 whether the PICC can 
be chosen excluding other laws is likewise not certain.168
Outside the Inter-American Convention, choice of the PICC appears largely unavailable. 
Party autonomy is excluded altogether in the Montevideo Treaties of 1889 and 1940,169 
and largely rejected in the domestic confl ict of laws rules relating to the courts170 of Bolivia,171 
Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, and Uruguay.172 It follows, a fortiori, that the PICC can only 
be integrated into the contract,173 but not chosen as applicable law.174 The same is true for 
Argentina and Chile, which allow for party autonomy but not for the choice of the PICC.175 
In both countries, the details still need clarifi cation.176
(6) Asia. Asian countries appear to be unanimous in refusing to recognize the PICC as 
applicable law. In the People’s Republic of China, such applicability is hardly endorsed.177 
In Japan, it appears that no court has yet used the PICC; scholars advocating their 
eligibility are in the minority.178 The new 2006 Japanese Choice of Law Act endorses party 
165 See the list of signatory countries to the Inter-American Convention (www.oas.org/juridico/english/
Sigs/b-56.html).
166 JL Siqueiros, ‘Los nuevos principios de UNIDROIT 2004 sobre contratos comerciales internacionales’ 
(2005) Rev der priv 129, 134 (see 135 for interpretation of uniform law).
167 Ley de Derecho Internacional Privado of 6 August 1998.
168 AA Andrade and NM Fernández, ‘Los Principios UNIDROIT en las Relaciones Comerciales 
Internacionales’ (2006) 25 Revista de Derecho, Universidad del Norte 47, 69–73. 
169 Tratados de Derecho Civil Internacional y de Derecho Comercial Internacional (Montevideo, 12 
February 1889), Tratados de Derecho Civil Internacional, de Derecho de Navegación Comercial Internacional 
y de Derecho Comercial Terrestre Internacional (Montevideo, 19 March 1940); L da Gama e Souza jr, ‘The 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and their Applicability in the MERCOSUR 
Countries’ (2002) 36 RJT 375, 387.
170 In all of these countries (except for Uruguay), party autonomy is accepted if the dispute is submitted to 
arbitration: J Kleinheisterkamp, International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America (2005) 325–327.
171 ibid 325.
172 da Gama e Souza jr (n 169 above) 390–394; Kleinheisterkamp (n 170 above) 324.
173 da Gama e Souza jr (n 161 above) 400–401.
174 ibid 403, 406.
175 Fernández Arroyo (ed), Derecho Internacional Privado (n 162 above) 1008–1010.
176 Kleinheisterkamp (n 170 above) 324–325.
177 H Danhan, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles and their Infl uence in the Modernisation of Contract Law in 
the People’s Republic of China’ [2003] ULR 107, 109, 116. But see Xun Ma, ‘Guo Ji Shang Shi He Tong Tong 
Ze’ and Xian Dai Shang Ren Fa’ [the UNIDROIT Principles and Modern Lex Mercatoria], [2006] Jiang Su 
Shang Lun [Jiangsu Commercial Forum] 104–106 (envisaging applicability by courts in the future).
178 See Y Nishitani, ‘Ist das Kollisionsrecht für den internationalen Rechts- und Wirtschaftsverkehr ein 
ausreichendes Instrumentarium? Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der “lex mercatoria”’, in K Riesenhuber 
and K Takayama (eds), Rechtsangleichung: Grundlagen, Methoden und Inhalte – Deutsch- Japanische Perspektiven 
(2006) 311, 324 with further references (also for lex mercatoria); T Kansaki, Contracts without a proper law in 
private international law and non-state law: Japanese Report Law – Report for the 17th Congress of the International 
Academy of Comparative Law (2006, unpublished).
61
62
63
Vogenauer-Preamble_I.indd   49 1/6/2009   10:43:51 AM
50 Michaels
Preamble I: Purposes of the PICC 
autonomy in its Art 7,179 but it does not address the question of non-state law.180 Similar 
information emerges with regard to Vietnam: even for those international contracts for 
which the application of Vietnamese law is not obligatory, Part 7 of the Civil Code of 
1 July 1996, which governs choice of law, does not provide for the application of non-
state law.181 A proposal to allow for the choice of the PICC in a future ASEAN Private 
International Law Convention is unlikely to succeed anytime soon.182
3. Choice of general principles of law or lex mercatoria (paragraph 3 of the Preamble).
General principles of law, a source of public international law,183 refer to principles common 
to the laws of all—or at least most—states in the world. Lex mercatoria, a somewhat vague 
and very contentious concept, describes an alleged body of non-national and transnational 
rules of law that have been created, at least in part, within commerce rather than by states.184 
Both general principles and the lex mercatoria are relevant more for arbitration than for 
domestic courts (see below, Preamble II); but the main three questions involved in para-
graph 3 of the Preamble can be dealt with here.
First, where general principles or the lex mercatoria have validly been chosen as the 
applicable law, can the PICC be applied as a codifi cation of the lex mercatoria? If the 
frequent claim that the PICC represent an adequate codifi cation of the lex mercatoria is 
valid,185 then their applicability is justifi ed. However, since no domestic confl ict of laws 
regimes currently allow for a choice of the lex mercatoria, this question is relevant only in 
arbitration.186
Second, can the parties’ reference to ‘general principles of law’ or the lex mercatoria be inter-
preted as an indirect designation of the PICC? This is a question of interpretation of the 
contract. This question is governed by the applicable choice of law regime or, where the 
179 Hô no Tekiyô ni kansuru Tsûsoku-Hô (Act on General Rules for Application of Laws), Law No 78 of 
21 June 2006; translated in (2006) 8 Yearbook of Private International Law 427 with comment by Y Okuda 
at 145.
180 See Y Nishitani, ‘Party Autonomy and its Restrictions by Mandatory Rules in Japanese Private International 
Law: Contractual Confl icts Rules’ in J Basedow et al (eds), Japanese and European Private International Law in 
Comparative Perspective (2008) 77, 87–88.
181 Le Net, ‘Vietnam’ in MJ Bonell (ed), A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts: The 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1999) 421, 427–428; MH Nguyen, ‘Les Principes 
UNIDROIT: Jurisprudence et expériences pour le Vietnam’ [2005] Int’l Bus LJ 619; D Van Dai, ‘Les Clauses 
de Droit Applicable au Vietnam’ [2005] Int’l Bus LJ 601.
182 B Hardjowahono, The Unifi cation of Private International Law on International Commercial Contracts 
within the Regional Legal System of ASEAN (2005) 204–205.
183 Art 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice of 26 June 1945.
184 R Michaels, ‘The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State’ (2007) 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 447 with further references.
185 Arbitral Award (Paris), ICC case no 8873, (1998) 125 Clunet 1017, with obs Harder, Unilex, G Baron, 
‘Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts form a new lex mercatoria?’ (1999) 15 
Arb Int’l 115; A Leduc, ‘L’émergence d’une nouvelle lex mercatoria à l’enseigne des principes d’UNIDROIT 
relatifs aux contrats du commerce international: thèse et antithèse’ (2001) 35 RJT 429; cf CW Fassberg, ‘Lex 
Mercatoria: Hoist with its own Petard?’ (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 67, 79–81; VR Anou-
Nigm, ‘The lex mercatoria and its current relevance in international commercial arbitration’ in Liber amicorum: 
Homenaje al professor Dr Opertti Badán (2005) 469, 483.
186 See below, Preamble II paras 16–20.
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PICC are incorporated into the contract, the applicable rules of domestic contract law, and 
thus not different between state courts and arbitrators. In general, caution seems in order: 
the lex mercatoria is different from the PICC in important ways, and parties, by choosing 
the lex mercatoria, may not expect the PICC to apply or may even be trying actively to avoid 
their application.187
Third, a choice of the lex mercatoria as applicable law may be impossible under the applic-
able choice of law regime where a choice of the PICC is possible (for example, under the 
proposed Art 3(2) of the draft Rome Regulation—see paras 52–54 above). In this situation, 
can the adjudicator, if the parties choose the lex mercatoria, apply the PICC to save the 
choice of law clause? Again, this is a matter for the applicable rules on choice of law or on 
contractual interpretation. In general, parties facing this scenario cannot reasonably object 
if the PICC are used to save an otherwise invalid choice.188
4. Applicability without a choice by the parties (paragraph 4 of the Preamble)
(a) The PICC as objective substantive law. Traditionally, where the parties do not 
choose a law to govern their contract, choice of law rules designate a domestic law on the 
basis of some objective criterion like the ‘closest connection’. Application of the PICC as 
objective law by a state court, as provided in paragraph 4 of the Preamble, would violate 
traditional choice of law principles. This use has garnered comparably less attention 
than the question of whether the parties can choose the PICC, a surprising contrast to 
the main model for the PICC, the US Restatement of the Law of Contracts, which is 
never discussed as an object of party choice.189 A provision like paragraph 4 was not even 
part of the 1994 edition of the PICC. Paragraph 4 was added in 2004 in light of arbitral 
decisions that had used the 1994 version of the PICC for this purpose.190 In addition, 
several academics have proposed substantive universal law as an alternative to the choice 
of law approach.
Many reasons given for the application of the PICC as objective law are unconvincing. 
Although many emphasize the diffi culty of traditional confl ict of laws in designating the 
applicable law,191 this diffi culty seems overrated. A stronger argument is that domestic laws 
are intrinsically inadequate for international contracts, but the PICC are not dramatically 
more international in focus than the domestic laws on which they draw (see para 24 above). 
The argument that state laws are unduly restrictive towards free trade192 is weak in view of 
the great scope that the PICC leave for restrictive mandatory norms (Art 1.4).
The PICC have the strongest claim for application as objective law where they con-
cern areas in which different domestic laws do not have strong differences in substance 
187 Kahn (n 21 above) 45, 47.
188 Michaels (n 4 above) 602.
189 Similarly D Oser, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: A Governing Law? 
(2008) 13–15.
190 (2003) Study L – Misc 25, paras 604 (Bonell) and 608 (Komarov); Bonell (n 111 above) 19–20.
191 H Schack, ‘Das IPR: Ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln, reif für das moderne Antiquariat?’ in H Krüger and 
HP Mansel (eds), Liber Amicorum Gerhard Kegel (2002) 179, 185–186.
192 Schilf (n 31 above) 2–4.
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or  policy.193 In these areas, the PICC are most likely to fulfi l both their restatement purpose 
(see paras 3–4 above) and their model purpose (see paras 5–6 above). As objective law in this 
sense, the PICC provide not a fully-fl edged legal system but rather a background law for the 
contractual agreement of the parties on the one hand and the mandatory norms of con-
cerned legal systems on the other. Notably, this also accords with the the US Restatements 
(the model for the PICC), which are not open for choice by the parties but which are applic-
able when there is no clearly deviating domestic law.
(b) Solutions under existing confl ict of laws regimes
(1) General comparative results. The concept of a substantive transnational law stands in 
confl ict with most traditional choice of law regimes that designate one offi cial legal system 
as the applicable law. Typically, choice of law rules speak of ‘the law of the state . . . ’ which 
is read unanimously to prevent the PICC from being applicable (see para 48 above). Only 
where choice of law rules designate ‘rules of law’ could such freedom exist, but this is not 
the case for domestic legal systems. If non-state law like the PICC is mentioned at all, it is 
usually not a fully applicable law, but merely a legal system to be taken into consideration, 
as in the Inter-American Convention (see para 78 below). Indeed, adjudicators usually 
only make occasional reference to the PICC. Where the PICC are used at all by state 
courts, they are not applied as the law governing a contract.
(2) European Union. Under Art 4(1) of the Rome Convention,194 when the parties do 
not choose the applicable law, ‘the contract shall be governed by the law of the country 
with which it is most closely connected’. The new European Regulation does not alter 
this reference to the law of a country.195 It follows that the PICC, which are not the law 
of a country, are not applicable. This appears to be undisputed even among authors who 
favour the applicability of the PICC if the parties have chosen them.196
It has been suggested to make the PICC applicable under Art 18 of the Rome Convention, 
which requires that ‘[i]n the interpretation and application of the preceding uniform rules, 
regard shall be had to their international character and to the desirability of achieving uni-
formity in their interpretation and application’.197 This seems incorrect. Unlike Art 9(2)(2) 
of the Inter-American Convention,198 Art 18 of the Rome Convention concerns the inter-
pretation of choice of law rules. The PICC, however, come into play only in the interpreta-
tion of substantive law. Whether substantive law should be interpreted in a way that 
accommodates the PICC is determined by that law itself. The new Rome I Regulation does 
not include a similar provision on its own interpretation.199
193 Vischer (n 137 above) 212–214.
194 See n 56 above.
195 See para 52 above.
196 Boele-Woelki (n 119 above) 672 (but see also her criticism of this solution at 672–674); Drobnig (n 
118 above) 392; Wichard (n 119 above) 294; E Lein, ‘La portée pratique des Principes UNIDROIT: une 
perspective allemande’ in E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on 
Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 169, 178–179; Teichert (n 4 above) 225–232.
197 Beraudo (n 90 above) 100–101.
198 See para 75 below.
199 n 129 above.
71
72
73
Vogenauer-Preamble_I.indd   52 1/6/2009   10:43:51 AM
   Preamble I: Purposes of the PICC
Michaels 53
(3) United States. In US law, if the parties have not chosen a law, the applicable law is 
currently always the law of a state or a nation; resorting to the PICC as applicable law is 
not discussed. The same is largely true for Canada.200 Inapplicability seems inevitable for 
traditional approaches that determine the applicable law on the basis of territorial sovereignty, 
since the PICC are not based on sovereign power, nor are they territorial. It is in contrast, 
however, with the frequent application of the Restatement 2d Contracts, one of the models 
for the PICC. Indeed, existing methods of choice of law do not require this result, and 
application of the PICC would actually be compatible with US law on confl ict of laws.
The PICC can apply in a governmental interest analysis, namely in ‘no-interest’ or ‘unpro-
vided-for’ cases—cases where no government is interested in the application of its own laws. 
Interest analysis provides no clear guidance for such cases, because under this approach, 
application of a state’s law is triggered only by the state’s interest in the law’s application. 
Where no governmental interests are involved, the application of a non-governmental law 
should be possible.
The PICC can also provide the applicable law under the Restatement 2d Confl ict of Laws. 
Application is excluded under a literal application, since § 188 of the Restatement desig-
nates the law of the state with the closest connection, and the PICC are not the law of any 
state.201 But since the Restatement 2d Confl ict of Laws is not a legislative act, it does not 
require literal application. Application of the PICC is attractive in view of the factors men-
tioned in § 6(2) of the Restatement, at least in cases without strong policy concerns. The 
needs of the interstate and international systems outlined in § 6(2)(a) are better served by 
the PICC than by application of a state law. Governmental interests under § 6(2)(b) and (c) 
are often not implicated; if they are, they can be dealt with through Art 1.4 PICC.
The protection of justifi ed expectations under § 6(2)(d) can be guaranteed in cases in which 
the parties did not positively expect the application of any one state law. In such situations 
the application of any such state law would be both surprising and arbitrary, while the PICC 
could function as a common denominator. Furthermore, even where parties consider the 
potentially applicable laws but do not choose an applicable law because they cannot agree 
on one, the PICC provide a better, more neutral background law against which such nego-
tiations can take place than an objectively determined domestic law. The basic policies 
underlying the fi eld (§ 6(2)(e)) are incorporated into the PICC. Certainty, predictability, 
and uniformity under § 6(2)(f ) can be guaranteed, as can the requirement under § 6(2)(g) 
for ease in the determination and application of the releveant law,
Finally, the PICC could also be applied, with limitations, under the so-called Better-Law 
Approach, which in essence designates the better of the several potential laws to be applic-
able. Where the PICC are in accordance with one of these potential laws, they can serve as 
a tie-breaker, provided they fulfi l their model purpose with regard to the specifi c norm (see 
paras 5–6 above, 83 below).
200 But see Glenn (n 95 above) 63 about the PICC as proper law under Québec choice of law when the 
parties have not chosen a law.
201 Symeonides (n 150 above) 215–216.
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(4) Latin America. Art 9(2)(2) of the Inter-American Convention requires that the 
Court ‘shall also take into account the general principles of international commercial law 
recognized by international organizations’.202 Art 10 of the Inter-American Convention 
provides: ‘In addition to the provisions in the foregoing articles, the guidelines, customs, 
and principles of international commercial law as well as commercial usage and practices 
generally accepted shall apply in order to discharge the requirements of justice and equity 
in the particular case’. Unlike Art 18 of the Rome Convention,203 these provisions obviously 
refer to substantive law, and legislative history shows that ‘principles of international 
commercial law’ includes the PICC.204
However, the actual scope is not clear. Some have argued that these provisions allow adju-
dicators to designate the PICC as applicable law when the parties have not made a choice.205 
This is unpersuasive in view of the legislative history—an explicit proposal of this sort 
by the US delegation had been rejected.206 It appears more plausible to read the two 
 provisions as suggesting use of the PICC to interpret and potentially supplement the appli-
cable domestic law (paragraph 6 of the Preamble).207 Arts 9 and 10 of the Inter-American 
Convention have been adopted, more or less verbatim, into Arts 30 and 31 of the 1998 
Venezuelan Private International Law Act.208 In countries that are not parties to the Inter-
American Convention, the PICC are not applicable.
(5) Asia. Applicablity of the PICC as law where the parties make no choice has been 
proposed for a potential ASEAN Convention,209 but so far to no avail.
5. Application where choice of law rules do not yield results
The choice of law process encompasses two steps: determining which law applies and deter-
mining the content of that law. Either step may be impossible to be put into practice with 
regard to national law. The PICC can help in different ways, depending on the step at which 
the problem arises.
202 n 160 above.
203 See para 70 above; for the Rome I Convention see n 117 above.
204 HS Burman, ‘International Confl ict of Laws, the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable 
to International Contracts, and Trends for the 1990s’ (1995) 28 Vand J Transnat’l L 367, 381. For closer analysis, 
see L Pereznieto Castro, ‘Los Principios de UNIDROIT y la Convención Interamericana sobre el Derecho 
Aplicable a los Contratos’ in Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas (ed), Contratación Internacional: Comentarios 
a los Principios sobre los Contratos Comerciales Internacionales del UNIDROIT (1998) 209, 211–215.
205 Juenger, ‘The Inter-American Convention’ (n 161 above); Siqueiros (n 161 above) 223–224 (perhaps); 
Beraudo (n 90 above) 109.
206 See Juenger, ‘The Inter-American Convention’ (n 161 above) 391; H Veytia, ‘The Requirements of 
Justice and Equity in Contracts’ (1995) 69 Tul LRev 1191, 1194–1195, both with slightly different texts of the 
proposal. According to Juenger, the proposal read: ‘If the parties have not selected the applicable law, or if this 
election proves ineffective, the contract shall be governed by the general principles of international commercial 
law accepted by international organizations’.
207 Samtleben (n 90 above) 390.
208 Ley de Derecho Internacional Privado y Exposición de Motivos, in (1998) 110 Revista de la Facultad de 
Cicencias Jurídicas y Poíticas de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 188 (see also n 167 above); J Samtleben, 
‘El enigma del Artículo 30 de la Ley de Derecho Internacional Privado’ in Libro Homenaje a Gonzalo Parra-
Aranguren, Addendum 2001 (2002) 355; Andrade and Fernández (n 168 above) 69–73.
209 Hardjowahono (n 182 above) 209.
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(a) Application when it cannot be determined what law applies. Sometimes, despite 
best efforts, a judge cannot determine which of several potentially applicable national laws 
applies, either because the applicable choice of law norms are unclear, or because the facts 
required to determine the connecting factor in the applicable choice of law rule cannot 
be established. Although the PICC have not yet been used for these situations, they can 
arguably provide a solution. To the extent that they fulfi l their restatement function (see 
paras 3–4 above), they can serve as a (rebuttable) presumption that all potentially applicable 
laws would lead to the same result, so the applicable law can be left undetermined and 
the PICC applied instead. Where, by contrast, the potentially applicable laws differ, the 
PICC may, insofar as their model purpose is fulfi lled (see paras 5–6 above), serve as a tie-
breaker in favour of that law with which they are in accordance. Details depend on the 
applicable choice of law regime.
(b) Application when the content of the applicable law cannot be established. A 
separate problem exists where the applicable law can be determined but its content 
remains unclear. Paragraph 4 of the Preamble of the 1994 edition of the PICC suggested 
that the PICC ‘may provide a solution to an issue raised when it proves impossible to 
establish the relevant rule of an applicable law’. Since this provision was thought to have 
limited practical importance,210 it has been relegated from the text of the 2004 edition 
of the PICC to an ‘other possible use’ in the Offi cial Comment.211 Yet given that these 
situations are frequent and traditional solutions unsatisfactory,212 the PICC can play an 
important role here.
Normally, a judge is required to determine the likely content of the applicable law even if 
the content cannot be determined with certainty. Rather than applying forum law, drawing 
on analogies to existing rules in the applicable law, or borrowing from a closely related legal 
system (as is frequently suggested),213 it is sometimes more satisfactory to draw on the 
PICC. Insofar as their restatement function is fulfi lled (see paras 3–4 above), the PICC can 
be presumed to contain the unavailable content of the applicable law (although existing 
case law shows that this presumption is often erroneous).214 They can therefore be applied, 
except where strong evidence suggests that they do not represent the content of the appli-
cable law and another legal system is more likely to represent that content.
210 (2003) Study L – Misc 25, paras 600–603; Bonell (n 9 above) 256–257.
211 Off Cmt 8 to Preamble, p 7.
212 For discussions, see N Jansen and R Michaels, ‘Die Auslegung und Fortbildung ausländischen Rechts’ 
(2003) 116 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess 3; M Jänterä-Jareborg, ‘Foreign Law in National Courts: A Comparative 
Perspective’ (2003) 304 Recueil des Cours 181, 307–324; S Gerooms, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation (2004) 
194–213.
213 Jänterä-Jareborg (n 212 above) 331–333; Gerooms (n 212 above) 211–212.
214 eg the Dutch case of Rechtbank Zwolle 5 March 1997 (HA ZA 95-640), (1997) 15 NIPR 282, Unilex: 
interpretation of good faith in French (as foreign) law based on PICC; the Spanish case of TS (Sala de lo Civil) 
4 July 2006 (2421/1999), RJ 2006 no 6080, Unilex: Art 1.7 used to interpret § 242 German Cc; the Italian 
case of Tribunale Rovereto 15 March 2007 (1052/04), Unilex: suggestion to use Art 7.4.13 to interpret English 
law rejected. See also J Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Los Principios UNIDROIT en la interpretación del derecho nacional 
por tribunales estatales’ in MP Ferrer Vanrell and A Martínez Cañellas, Derecho contractual europeo y Principios 
UNIDROIT (forthcoming).
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Where the content of the applicable law can be determined but gaps exist, a judge should 
fi ll those gaps by analogy, and if necessary develop the applicable law further to the 
extent possible within the spirit of that law.215 In some ways, this is no different from 
ordinary interpretation of domestic law, for which the PICC have a role to play (see 
paras 111–117 below). However, to the extent that policy decisions must be made, 
judges will often have a hard time arguing within the spirit of the foreign law, and the 
PICC are often a more reliable source for such decisions than speculations on the for-
eign law’s policy. Insofar as their model function is fulfi lled (see paras 5–6 above), 
the PICC can thus provide an important source of inspiration for the development of 
foreign law.
Where all of these steps do not yield a solution, many legal systems provide, either 
explicitly or customarily, that an alternative body of law should be applied instead of 
the normally applicable law whose content remains unascertainable. In most cases this 
is the law of the forum as generally subsidiary law. By contrast, some authors have 
proposed to use uniform law or general principles as a substitute,216 which would sug-
gest the application of the PICC.217 This last view is the most adequate. Where the 
normally applicable law cannot be determined, a subsidiary law needs to be deter-
mined but lex fori is inadequate. Insofar as their restatement and model functions 
are fulfilled, the PICC can apply as the generally subsidiary law for international 
contracts.
IV. Use for the purposes of interpretation and supplementation 
(paragraphs 5–6 of the Preamble)
1. International uniform laws (paragraph 5 of the Preamble)
(a) General issues
(1) Interpretation. International uniform laws must normally be interpreted in an 
autonomous manner; supplementation with domestic law must remain an exception. 
Their goal of achieving uniformity would be severely hampered if each court interpreted 
them in accordance with its own domestic principles.218 However, general principles 
for such interpretation are lacking. Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties219 is technically applicable, it is ill-suited.220 Its focus is on so-called traités-contrats 
(treaties exchanging rights and duties among states), and its rules are mostly borrowed 
215 Jansen and Michaels (n 212 above) 18, 39–44.
216 H Kötz, ‘Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze als Ersatzrecht’ (1970) 34 RabelsZ 663; K Kreuzer ‘Einheitsrecht 
als Ersatzrecht: zur Frage der Nichtermittelbarkeit fremden Rechts’ [1983] NJW 1943.
217 For the Inter-American Convention, see Veytia (n 206 above) 1197.
218 UP Gruber, Methoden des internationalen Einheitsrechts (2004) 80–86; J Felemegas, ‘Introduction’ in 
J Felemegas (ed), An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law (2007) 10–13, both with references. 
219 United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331.
220 See Gruber (n 218 above) 121–124.
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from contract law, applied here to treaties as contracts among states. By contrast, uniform 
law generally consists of so-called traités-lois (treaties establishing substantive law), and the 
relevant interpretative principles must be those for laws. This makes it necessary to resort 
to general principles of interpretation.
Following the explicit provisions in Art 7 CISG, three levels of interpretation can be dis-
tinguished. On a fi rst level, uniform law must be interpreted in independence from other 
texts and sources, with a view especially to its text and its objectives and purposes (‘truly 
autonomous interpretation’). Here, the PICC can play a role based on their model character 
(see paras 5–6 above); certainly insofar as they have served as a model for the uniform law 
(see para 93 below), but also insofar as the respective adjudicator considers them to deter-
mine which of several possible interpretations is the most appropriate.
On a second level, uniform law must be interpreted in the light of general principles of 
uniform, transnational, and comparative law—not truly autonomously, but autonomously 
from individual domestic laws (‘transnational interpretation’). Here the PICC can play a 
role based on their restatement function (see paras 3–4 above), but they can fulfi l this func-
tion only to the extent that they actually restate these general principles.221 They can, at least 
prima facie, be used to provide the general principles needed for interpretation. This is so 
especially where interpretation of the uniform law should be based on a comparison of rele-
vant domestic and international laws, since such a comparison underlies much of the PICC. 
On a third level, an additional law must be determined to supplement the norms of the 
uniform law. Here, the PICC can provide this law if their application complies with the 
applicable choice of law rules.
That the PICC form a private codifi cation of non-binding nature is irrelevant for both 
their restatement function and their model function.222 It follows that the PICC can be used 
for interpretation even though they are not formally effective law.223 Nor does it matter, as 
many have argued,224 whether they were passed after the respective uniform law—as long 
as either the principles restated by the PICC are the principles that underlie the uniform 
law, or the substance of the PICC provides an attractive model for interpretation of uniform 
law within the adjudicator’s interpretative discretion.
The starting point of all interpretation of uniform law is the text of the uniform law. To the 
extent that the PICC contain more specifi c defi nitions or details of terms and rules that can 
be found in the uniform law text as well, they can often be used for its interpretation. 
However, similar terminology alone is not suffi cient, since terms can have different  meanings 
between different texts. The PICC can be used only under certain conditions. Where a 
221 Bonell (n 9 above) 233; Wichard (n 119 above) 297; Burkart (n 4 above) 214–219; Canaris (n 4 above) 
28; Petz (n 4 above) 96; see also MdP Perales Viscasillas, ‘UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts: Sphere of Application and General Provisions’ (1996) 13 Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 381, 404.
222 See paras 4–7 above.
223 cf F Sabourin, ‘Quebec’ in MJ Bonell (ed), A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts: The 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1999) 237, 247–248.
224 eg JJ Fawcett, JM Harris and M Bridge, International Sale of Goods in the Confl ict of Laws (2005) 
934 – 935.
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uniform law text passed after the PICC explicitly adopts the PICC’s terminology, the PICC 
can be used for interpretation (based on their model purpose—see paras 5–6 above) because 
then the defi nitions and interpretation of the PICC can be presumed to have been adopted 
as well. Where the uniform law did not explicitly adopt the relevant rules and terms from 
the PICC (because the law was either passed before the PICC or borrows its terminology 
from somewhere else), the PICC can still be used (based on their restatement purpose—see 
paras 3–4 above) insofar as the rules and terms that the uniform law refers to are accurately 
restated in the PICC.
In addition, uniform law must be interpreted according to its goals and purposes. The 
PICC cannot help in determining these goals of uniform law. However, similarity of pur-
poses (especially regarding their model and effective law functions) is a precondition for the 
PICC to serve as an aid in interpretation.
To some extent, the genesis of the uniform law, especially as derived from preparatory 
mater ials, provides a valid criterion of interpretation. Here, the PICC have an obvious role 
to play if they provided an explicit basis for the creation of the uniform law (see para 117 
below). Where this was not the case, the PICC can still be used if the uniform law was based 
on a comparison of the same domestic and international laws that went into the PICC, but 
this latter use is bound to be limited to situations in which the drafters of the uniform law 
really aimed at codifying a common core.
The biggest role for the PICC in interpretation exists where uniform law is, as is frequently 
the case, supposed to be interpreted on a comparative analysis of the legal orders of the dif-
ferent countries governed by the uniform law.225 Traditionally, such comparative interpreta-
tion was regularly too complex for adjudicators. Now, where comparative interpretation of 
uniform law is intended to make sure that the uniform law accords with domestic laws, the 
PICC can help based on their restatement purpose.226 Where, by contrast, a comparative 
interpretation is aimed at giving the adjudicator a superior solution, the PICC can provide 
such a solution based on their model purpose.227
(2) Supplementation. Only where an interpretation or analogy does not yield results, 
the uniform law must be supplemented with some other text. Typically, resort is had to 
domestic law, determined through some choice of law rule. However, supplementation 
with domestic law is unattractive, so resorting to the PICC is often advisable. The PICC 
are written for the same kind of international transaction as the uniform law they are 
supposed to supplement. In addition, to the extent that the PICC can also be used 
for interpretation (see para 87 above), no differentiation between interpretation and 
supplementation need be made—an important advantage over Art 7(1) and (2) CISG. 
Of course, the problem remains that the PICC themselves need to be interpreted and 
potentially supplemented (see Art 1.6).228
225 Gruber (n 218 above) 198–204.
226 ibid 200.
227 But for the dangers of such a short-cut, see Kleinheisterkamp (n 214 above).
228 eg Gerechtshof ‘s-Hertogenbosch 16 October 2002 (HA ZA 98-1077), NIPR 2003, no 192, excerpt in 
German with comment by A Janssen in [2004] IHR 194: no rules on whether standard terms must be made 
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The PICC can be used for supplementation only within the scope of the respective uni-
form law.229 For example, because contract validity is excluded from the CISG (see Art 4 
CISG), Chapter 3 of the PICC cannot be used for interpretation or supplementation. 
Rather, questions outside the scope of the uniform law must be determined by another law 
to be determined through choice of law. Although it seems especially desirable in this situa-
tion for the PICC to play this role, the question is resolved through ordinary choice of law 
rules.
(3) General part of uniform contract law. Due to their character as general contract law 
(see para 17 above), the PICC can play a role in interpretation and supplementation for a 
great number of uniform laws. This should help in bringing about more consistency and 
coherence in international uniform commercial law.230 Moreover, the PICC could play the role 
of a general part of unifi ed contract law, much like Art 1 UCC in the USA or like §§ 241–432 
German Cc.231 Their adequacy for interpretation and supplementation would then not have 
to be demonstrated afresh for each new uniform law. It requires that they are suffi ciently 
attuned to existing uniform contract law, which, it is submitted, is the case.232 In addition, 
their connection with specifi c instruments makes their interpretation more precise, too.233
(b) Special applications
(1) The CISG and other UNCITRAL Conventions. In 2004 the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) circulated the 2004 edition of the 
PICC to its member states for possible endorsement, envisaging that ‘such circulation would 
facilitate coordination between UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT and would be of assistance 
to states that were not members of UNIDROIT and to other prospective users in using the 
UNIDROIT principles in their legislative and other work’.234 However, instead of a formal 
endorsement that had been widely anticipated for 2007,235 or an offi cial recommendation 
of their use for interpretation,236 the General Assembly of UNCITRAL decided merely to 
available to the other party in order to become part of the contract in either the CISG or Art 2.20 of the 1994 
edition of the PICC (now Art 2.1.20 PICC); Art 2.104 PECL applied.
229 Bonell (n 9 above) 233; J Basedow, ‘Die UNIDROIT-Prinzipien der Internationalen Handelsverträge 
und die Übereinkommen des einheitlichen Privatrechts: Eine theoretische Studie zur praktischen Anwendung 
des internationalen Transportrechts, besonders der CMR’ in J Basedow et al (eds), Festschrift für Ulrich Drobnig 
zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (1998) 19, 29; cf H Mather, ‘Choice of law for international sales issues not resolved 
by the CISG’ (2001) 20 J L & Com 155, 180–182, 188, 195–196, 198–200.
230 U Magnus, ‘Konventionsübergreifende Interpretation internationaler Staatsverträge privatrechtlichen 
Inhalts’ in J Basedow et al (eds), Aufbruch nach Europa: 75 Jahre Max-Planck-Institut für Privatrecht (2001) 572, 
577; for criticism see M Torsello, Common Features of Uniform Law Conventions (2004) 73.
231 P Karrer, ‘Internationalization of Civil Procedure: Beyond the IBA Rules of Evidence’ [2004] ULR 893, 
895; Schilf (n 25 above); Kronke (n 3 above) 456–457; see para 9 above.
232 But see G Herrmann, ‘Vision for UNCITRAL: Global Commerce Needs a Global Uniform Law’ [2001] 
Business Law International 249, 251–252, criticizing insuffi cient attention to the United Nations Convention 
on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods (New York, 14 June 1974) (www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1974Convention_limitation_period.html).
233 SM Carbone, ‘Principi dei contratti internazionali e norme di origine internazionale (con particolare 
riguardo al diritto uniforme)’ [1997] Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata II 25.
234 Offi cial Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fi rst Session, Supplement No 17 (A/61/17), para 234.
235 ibid; (2006) Study L – Doc 99, para 5; Bonell (n 81 above) 239.
236 ibid 240.
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‘commend . . . the use of the Unidroit Principles 2004, as appropriate, for their intended 
purposes’.237 It is unclear whether this was a deliberate distinction driven by caution over 
unintended far-reaching consequences238 or whether it presents a mere terminological 
distinction without consequences (as claimed by UNIDROIT).239 The exact effect of this 
commendation is also unclear.
The CISG is the international instrument for which the PICC can become most useful.240 
First, the PICC themselves were developed in parallel to and are closely modelled after the 
CISG, so their solutions are by and large either compatible with the system of the CISG or 
drafted with the specifi c purpose of remedying its shortcomings.241 The goals of interpret-
ing the CISG set out in its Art 7(1)—international character, uniformity in application, 
observance of good faith—are all matched by the PICC. Second, the PICC cover several 
areas left outside the explicit scope of the CISG. At the same time, because of the close 
proximity between the instruments, gaps in the CISG are frequently mirrored by gaps in 
the PICC.242 Third, the PICC are more specifi c than the CISG—to some extent in the 
rules, but even more so in their Offi cial Comment.243 Even the CISG Advisory Council uses 
the PICC frequently for its interpretation of the CISG.244 It has even been suggested that 
adjudicators are obliged to consult the PICC;245 this appears exaggerated.
237 Offi cial Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No 17 (A/62/17), para 213. 
The full text of the resolution is as follows:
  ‘The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
 –  Expressing its appreciation to the International Institute for the Unifi cation of Private Law (Unidroit) for 
transmitting to it the text of the 2004 edition of the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts,
 –  Taking note that the Unidroit Principles 2004 complement a number of international trade law instruments, 
including the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980),
 –  Noting that the preamble of the Unidroit Principles 2004 states that the Unidroit Principles 2004 set forth 
general rules for international contracts and that: [follows text of Preamble]
 –  Congratulating Unidroit on having made a further contribution to the facilitation of international trade by 
preparing general rules for international commercial contracts,
 –  Commends the use of the Unidroit Principles 2004, as appropriate, for their intended purposes.’
 The PICC are not included among the endorsed texts listed at www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/other_
organizations_texts.html.
238 See the critical remarks by the former Secretary General of UNCITRAL (n 232 above).
239 (2007) CD (87) 2, p 16. 
240 See the article-by-article analysis in Part II of Felemegas (n 218 above).
241 Bonell (n 9 above) 305.
242 See Gerechtshof ‘s-Hertogenbosch 16 October 2002 (n 228 above); B Zeller, ‘Measurement of damages 
when contract avoided: Remarks on the manner in which the UNIDROIT Principles may be used to interpret or 
supplement Article 76 of the CISG’ in J Felemegas (ed), An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law (2007) 223.
243 Arbitral Award 6 June 2003, International Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
of the Russian Federation case no 97/2002, Unilex, para 3.4: Off Cmt to Art 7.4.7, p 243, is used to interpret 
Arts 74 and 77 CISG.
244 eg CISG Advisory Council Opinion No 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74 (2006); cf the 
cautious remarks of the rapporteur of the Opinion, JY Gotanda, ‘Using the UNIDROIT Principles to Fill Gaps 
in the CISG’ in D Saidov and R Cunnington (eds), Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives 
(2008) 107. On the role of the CISG Advisory Council, see L Mistelis, ‘CISG-AC Publishes First Opinions’ 
(http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC.html).
245 Burkart (n 4 above) 222–223.
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Under Art 7(2) CISG, ‘[q]uestions concerning matters governed by [the CISG] which are 
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which 
it is based . . . ’. With some exceptions (discussed in comments on individual articles in this 
Commentary), the PICC can serve as ‘general principles underlying the CISG’.246 Many 
have argued against this possibility, pointing out that the CISG predates the PICC and can 
therefore logically not be based on them.247 This is a misunderstanding. What underlies the 
CISG are not the PICC but rather the general principles that the PICC have restated.248 
Use in this sense is therefore justifi ed (and limited) by the restatement function of the 
PICC (see paras 3–4 above). In addition, the PICC can serve as general principles also in 
their model function (see paras 5–6 above) where an adjudicator looks for the most attract-
ive interpretation of an unclear provision. Where they fulfi l neither purpose, they cannot 
apply. As desirable as it might seem to use the PICC in their entirety as a ‘general part of the 
CISG’, this seems currently impossible without a formal adoption by the treaty parties.
Strictly speaking, the PICC are used not as general principles but as elaborations on such 
principles. Most rules in the PICC are too specifi c to constitute general principles (see para 
12 above). Indeed, where the PICC do express general principles, their use for the CISG is 
problematic. For example, the CISG does not expressly submit parties to a general principle 
of good faith, and there is an ongoing dispute over whether this principle can be read into 
the CISG.249 In view of this debate, the existence of such a principle in the PICC (Art 1.7) 
cannot be viewed as conclusive for the CISG.250 By contrast, the PICC are most useful 
where they are more specifi c than the rules of the CISG.251 In some cases, the PICC can 
serve to specify unclear rules in the CISG. For example, the rule on fundamental breach 
in Art 25 CISG can be interpreted in light of the factors listed in Art 7.3.1(2) PICC.252 
246 Arbitral Award December 1997 (Paris), ICC case no 8817, (1999) 10(2) ICC Int’l Ct Arb Bull 75, 
Unilex: ‘its general principles [are] now contained in the [PICC]’; similarly Arbitral Award 1995 (Basle), ICC 
case no 8128, (1996) 123 Clunet 1024, Unilex: ‘The arbitrator considers it justifi ed to apply to the dispute 
identical rules contained in the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL as general principles in the sense of 
Article 7(2) of the Vienna Convention 1980’; Magnus (n 32 above) 54–55; AR Vidal Olivares, ‘La función 
integradora de los principios generales en la compraventa internacional de mercaderías y los principios de la 
UNIDROIT sobre contratos comerciales internacionales’ [2003] ADC 993, 1032–1040; Burkart (n 4 above) 
213–221 with references.
247 eg F Ferrari, ‘General Principles and International Uniform Commercial Law Conventions: A Study of 
the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention and the 1988 UNIDROIT Conventions on International Factoring and 
Leasing’ (1998) 10 Pace Int’l LRev 157, 168; cf Drobnig (n 118 above) 228.
248 Basedow (n 87 above) 136–137.
249 See the discussion in BC Sheehy, ‘Good Faith in the CISG: Interpretation Problems in Article 7’ (2005–
2006) Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 153.
250 But see Bridge (n 118 above) 132–133.
251 Bonell (n 9 above) 318–325.
252 Bridge (n 118 above) 134; R Koch, ‘Whether the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts may be used to interpret or supplement Article 25 CISG’ [2005] IHR 65 = ‘“Fundamental breach”: 
Commentary on whether the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts may be used to 
interpret or supplement Article 25 CISG’ in J Felemegas (ed), An International Approach to the Interpretation 
of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law 
(2007) 124; Bonell (n 9 above) 318.
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In addition, the PICC are often mentioned merely to point out that rules from the CISG 
have been generalized for all contract types; here, they do not play an important role.253
An important problem in using the PICC concerns the question of whether the matters in 
question are governed by the CISG (so that general principles become relevant under Art 
7(2) CISG) or not (so that the applicable law must be determined through choice of law). 
Some whole areas are expressly outside the scope of the CISG. For example, contract valid-
ity is explicitly excluded in Art 4(a) CISG, so recourse to Chapter 3 of the PICC must 
likewise be excluded. Other individual issues are not expressly excluded, thus raising the 
issue of whether Art 7(2) CISG, and thus the PICC, can apply. The most contentious 
lacuna in the CISG concerns interest rates (Arts 78 and 84(1) CISG).254 Under the tradi-
tional approach, it is necessary to determine the applicable national law according to choice 
of law rules.255 This means one important advantage of the CISG—uniformity and the 
avoidance of domestic law—is lost. Art 7.4.9(2) PICC can be used to fi ll this lacuna.256 This 
is so even though Art 7.4.9(2) does not restate a common core or a general principle under-
lying the CISG: the calculation of the proper amount of interest was (and remains) dis-
puted, which is why the matter was left out of the CISG. Instead, Art 7.4.9(2) can be used 
on the basis of the model purpose (see paras 5–6 above): it expresses a solution for which 
there is broad consensus, and it is adequate for the purposes of the CISG. Most of all, its 
adoption can ensure the need for uniformity envisaged in Art 7(1) CISG.257
253 eg CA Grenoble 23 October 1996, [1997] Rev arb 87, Unilex: Art 57(1) CISG and Art 6.1.6 PICC; 
Arbitral Award December 1997 (Paris), ICC case no 8817 (n 246 above): Art 9.1 CISG and Art 1.8 PICC, Art 
77 CISG and Art 7.4.8 PICC; Arbitral Award March 1998 (Zurich), ICC case no 9117, (1999) 10(2) ICC 
Int’l Ct Arb Bull 96, Unilex: Art 29(2) CISG and Art 2.18 of the 1994 edition of the PICC (now Art 2.1.18 
PICC); Arbitral Award, ICC case no 11849, (2006) 31 YB Comm Arb 151: Art 74 CISG and Art 2.18 of the 
1994 edition of the PICC (now Art 2.1.18 PICC).
254 See the discussion in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Bacher Art 78 paras 26–36, with further references.
255 ibid Art 78 para 27 n 25.
256 Arbitral Award 20 May 2003, Supreme Economic Court of the Republic of Belarus case no 8-5/2003; 
Arbitral Award 15 June 1994 (Vienna), Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen 
Wirtschaft case no SCH-4318: para 5.8; Arbitral Award 15 June 1994 (Vienna), Internationales Schiedsgericht 
der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft case no SCH-4366, [1994] RIW 591: para 5.2.2 with note 
by P Schlechtriem; A Veneziano, ‘La Convenzione sulla vendita internazionale e i Principi UNIDROIT dei 
contratti commerciali internazionali, in due recenti lodi della Corte arbitrale della Camera di Commercio di 
Vienna’ (1995) Riv arb 547 and I Seidl-Hohenveldern, (1995) 122 Clunet 1055; Arbitral Award 1995 (Basle), 
ICC case no 8128, (1996) 123 Clunet 1024, with obs D Hascher, Unilex; Arbitral Award (Zurich), ICC case 
no 8769, (1999) 10(2) ICC Int’l Ct Arb Bull 75; Arbitral Award 19 May 2004, International Arbitration Court 
at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation case no 100/2002, Unilex; Schlechtriem/
Schwenzer/Bacher Art 78 para 31a; KL Kizer, ‘Minding the Gap: Determining Interest Rates under the UN 
Convention for the International Sale of Goods’ (1998) UChic LRev 1279, 1294–1296. This is not a majority 
opinion: for debate, see n 255 above.
257 The PICC can fi ll other similar gaps too, such as the admissibility of and limits on contract penalties 
(Art 7.4.13): Arbitral Award 5 June 1997, International Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of the Russian Federation case no 229/1996, Unilex; Arbitral Award 27 July 1999, International 
Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation case no 302/1997, 
Unilex; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Stoll/Gruber Art 74 para 49. See also below, Art 7.4.13 para 22. 
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It has been suggested that the PICC can serve to identify the general usages that parties are 
deemed to have implicitly made applicable to their contracts (Art 9(2) CISG).258 This seems 
doubtful. The PICC mostly restate legal rules, not actual trade usages; in fact, their Art 1.8 
is quite similar in this regard to Art 9(2) CISG.259 Without more precise knowledge of an 
individual rule, it cannot be presumed to constitute a usage in the sense of Art 9(2) 
CISG.260
(2) Other Conventions. Use of the PICC for the interpretation and supplementation 
of UNIDROIT Conventions raises the fewest problems. Although all UNIDROIT 
Conventions are negotiated amongst countries (unlike the PICC), the fact that both are 
created under the banner of the same institution allows for a presumption that the PICC 
can be used for their interpretation. However, it is important to look carefully at whether 
the purpose and scope of the PICC and the respective Convention are the same. Thus, for 
example, if the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 
asks that interpretation and gap-fi lling occur ‘in conformity with the general principles 
on which it is based’,261 it would be risky to assume that the PICC can deliver these 
general principles. That Convention deals with collaterals rather than general contract 
law, and the PICC’s emphasis on good faith would confl ict with the overarching need 
in the law of collaterals for legal certainty.262 On the other hand, the PICC can very well 
serve to interpret the 1988 Factoring Convention263 (although that Convention predates 
the PICC), to the extent the PICC codify the general principles on which the Factoring 
Convention is based (see its Art 4(2)).
Given the close collaboration between UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL, the PICC should 
also prove useful for the interpretation of UNCITRAL Conventions, including those other 
258 Arbitral Award 5 June 1997, International Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
the Russian Federation case no 229/1996 (n 257 above); Arbitral Award 27 July 1999, International Arbitration 
Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation case no 302/1997 (n 257 above); 
cf Gotanda (n 244 above) section V; A Janssen, ‘Die Einbeziehung von allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen 
in internationale Kaufverträge und die Bedeutung der UNIDROIT- und der Lando-Principles: Zugleich 
Anmerkung zu Hof ’s Hertogenbosch (Niederlande), Urteil vom 23.10.2002, Nr C 01/00017, NIPR 2003, Nr 
192’ [2004] IHR 194, 199; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Schmidt-Kessel Art 9 para 26. For a differentiated rule-
by-rule solution, see Fawcett, Harris and Bridge (n 224 above) 935–936.
259 See below, Art 1.8 paras 4, 17–18; J Oviedo Albán, ‘Usages and practices: Editorial remarks on the 
manner in which the UNIDROIT Principles may be used to interpret or supplement CISG Article 9’ in 
J Felemegas (ed), An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law (2007) 51.
260 The situation is different where explicit reference is made to the PICC for determination of usages, as 
in Art 31(3) of the ITC Contractual Joint Venture Model Agreement (three parties or more) and Art 23(3) 
of the ITC Contractual Joint Venture Model Agreement (two parties only), see International Trade Center 
UNCTAD/WTO, ITC Contractual Joint Venture Model Agreements (2004) 26, 77 (www.jurisint.org/doc/orig/
con/en/2004/2004jiconen3/2004jiconen3.pdf ); see also JP Vulliéty, ‘Le contrat-type pour les Joint Ventures 
contractuelles du Centre du Commerce International au regard des Principes d’UNIDROIT et d’autres normes 
d’unifi cation du droit des contrats’ [2004] ULR 295, 301–303.
261 Art 5(2) of the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town, 16 November 
2001) (www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/main.htm).
262 Kronke (n 3 above) 459.
263 UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring (Ottawa, 28 May 1988) (www.unidroit.org/
english/conventions/1988factoring/1988factoring-e.htm).
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than the CISG. This is so even though UNCITRAL itself stopped short of a formal endorse-
ment (see para 98 above).
The PICC can be used to interpret Conventions dealing with transportation matters, espe-
cially the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 
(CMR), but also others.264 Even though the CMR does not contain a provision similar to 
Art 7 CISG, it seems appropriate to use the same principles of interpretation (see paras 
88–95 above). This makes the PICC useful for a variety of issues that are unclear under the 
text of the CMR.265 There is little weight in the counter-argument that the PICC are based 
on contractual autonomy (Art 1.1 PICC) whereas the CMR is binding in its entirety (Art 41 
CMR): in fact, it is precisely because the CMR is binding that it becomes necessary to resort 
to general contract rules for its interpretation, because the intention of the parties must be 
irrelevant.266 This gives the PICC an important role for matters of form, contractual liabil-
ity, and good faith.
In order to give a broad meaning to the term ‘international’ in the 1975 Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,267 the Venezuelan Supreme Court 
invoked what is now Offi cial Comment 1 to the Preamble (see paras 21–24 above).268 
Given that the Convention does not deal with contracts, the reference is not very convin-
cing or relevant.
(3) European Union law. The PICC can be useful in interpreting and supplementing 
EU contract law. Actual use so far is sparse and inconclusive.269 But the PICC provide 
helpful rules to interpret especially the numerous European Directives in the area of 
contract law,270 and also to help specify the so-called ‘general principles’ of EU law 
in the area of private law.271 At fi rst sight the PECL might appear more appropriate, 
but both texts are quite similar,272 and the greater practical experience with the PICC 
264 For the International Convention for the Unifi cation of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading 
(Brussels, 25 August 1924) (Hague Rules), see Carbone (n 233 above) 29, 30.
265 Basedow (n 229 above) 31–32 and 35–37; Bonell (n 9 above) 229–230.
266 Basedow (n 229 above) 33. 
267 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama City, 30 January 1975) 
438 UNTS 245, (1975) 14 ILM 336 (www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-35.html).
268 Supreme Court of Venezuela 9 October 1998 (summary in [1998] ULR 176); da Gama e Souza jr (n 
169 above) 414.
269 Jung (n 4 above) 84, 90–91.
270 ibid 84–85 with specifi c suggestions: Art 7.4.1 for a general concept of damages, Art 7.4.2 for non-
monetary damages in vacation litigation, Art 7.1.7 with comments for the defi nition of force majeure in Art 9 
of the Directive 97/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 on cross-border 
credit transfers [1997] OJ L 43/25; CM Bianca, in S Grundmann and CM Bianca (eds), EU-Kaufrechtsrichtlinie: 
Kommentar (2002) Art 3 para 81: application of Art 7.1.3 within Directive 1999/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated 
guarantees [1999] OJ L 171/12.
271 S Grundmann, ‘Law merchant als lex lata’ (n 126 above) 156; O Meyer, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles and 
their impact on European private law: some comments on the opinion (31 January 2002) of Advocate General 
LA Geelhoed, ‘Court of Justice of the European Communities in case C-334/00 – Tacconi‡’ [2002] ULR
1222, 1225–1226; Jung (n 4 above) 86.
272 Meyer (n 271 above) 1225–1226.
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appears to qualify them better, at least in the eyes of those who have referred to either 
document.
The PICC can also be useful for the Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments.273 They have been invoked in the context of 
Art 5(3) of the Brussels Regulation (delictual liability): Advocate General Geelhoed 
referred to what is now Art 2.1.15 PICC to determine whether breaking off negotiations 
could lead to pre-contractual liability. However, use of the PICC was not decisive, since the 
question was only whether such liability, if existing, should be viewed as tortious for the 
purpose of Art 5(3) of the Brussels Regulation.274 Actually, the PICC could be more useful 
for Art 5(1) of the Brussels Regulation. In a traditional interpretation, the place of perform-
ance of a contract is determined either by the Brussels Regulation or by the applicable 
domestic law. It would be more attractive autonomously to use the PICC to determine 
general principles, like the place of performance for monetary obligations under Art 
6.1.6.275 Art 1.9(2) can also suggest the existence and relevance of certain uses regarding 
the place of performance.276
2. Domestic law (paragraph 6 of the Preamble)
A provision concerning the interpretation and supplementation of domestic law was not 
included in the 1994 edition of the PICC, and was added only in view of actual practice 
using the PICC for this purpose.277 Suggestions of combining this use with that of para-
graph 5 of the Preamble were rejected because the use for uniform international law had 
proven to be controversial.278 Indeed, the interpretation and supplementation of domestic 
law is prima facie different from that of uniform law. First, most domestic legal systems 
(especially in the continental tradition) are presumed to be complete, so interpretation 
would need to draw entirely on material within the system and leave no room for the PICC. 
Second, many legal systems (especially in the common law tradition) base the legitimacy of 
law, including contract law, on the command of the sovereign, so the PICC as non-offi cial 
273 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 12/1.
274 ECJ Case C-334/00 Fonderie Offi cine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v Heinrich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik 
GmbH [2002] ECR I-7357, opinion of the Advocate-General, paras 55–56 and 59 n 45; see MJ Bonell, 
‘Pre -contractual liability, the Brussels Jurisdiction Convention and . . . the UNIDROIT Principles (Case 
334/00 – Tacconi v HWS)’ in PH Delvaux et al (eds), Mélanges offerts a Marcel Fontaine (2003) 359, 364–365, 
368–370.
275 CA Grenoble 23 October 1996 (n 253 above); B Gsell, ‘Autonom bestimmter Gerichtsstand am 
Erfüllungsort nach der Brüssel I-Verordnung’ [2002] IPRax 484, 491; Tribunale di Padova, Sezione di Este 11 
January 2005, Unilex; M Luby and S Poillot-Peruzzetto, ‘Chronique: Droit international et européen’ [2006] 
JCP 157; F Ferrari, ‘Remarks on the Autonomous Interpretation of the Brussels 1 Regulation, in Particular of 
the Concept of “Place of Delivery” under Article 5(1)(b), and the Vienna Sales Convention (on the Occasion of 
a Recent Italian Court Decision)’ [2007] Int’l Bus LJ 83, 93; also A Veneziano, ‘The Application of UNIDROIT 
Principles in International Sales’ [2001] Int’l Bus LJ 477, 482.
276 CA Grenoble 7 May 1997 (97-049233) (LexisNexis), p 5. 
277 (2003) Study L – Misc 25, paras 594 (Bonell) and 603; Bonell (n 9 above) 234 n 170.
278 (2003) Study L – Misc 25, paras 596 (Bonell) and 600 (Lando).
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law would play no role. As both views are changing, the PICC can become more relevant, 
although their role so far is quite limited, at least in state courts.279
Clearly the PICC as a non-binding instrument cannot trump binding domestic law where 
its content is clear.280 For unresolved questions, they may provide additional support for 
one of the various possible responses281—although in this regard they do not stand above 
scholarly opinions or other secondary sources, and are in fact often cited side by side with 
those.282 In some decisions listed on Unilex they play an even lesser role of pure illustra-
tion.283 More importantly, they can even serve as tie-breakers between otherwise equally 
attractive responses.284 For example, Arts 4.1–4.3 PICC have been invoked to abolish or at 
least restrain the English rule that pre-contractual negotiations cannot be used for the inter-
pretation of a contract.285 The justifi cation can lie both in their restatement function—their 
application guarantees that domestic law is in accordance with international consensus—
and in their model function—they represent a solution that a group of experts considered 
preferable after considerable debate, especially for contracts that are both international and 
commercial.286
279 For Australian law see M Sychold, ‘The Impact of the UNIDROIT Contract Principles on Australian 
Law’ in E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on Contractual 
Practice, Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 149, 150–153. For Lithuanian law see T Žukas, ‘Reception of 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract 
Law in Lithuania’ in ibid 231, 238–239; see also n 293 below. For Dutch law see Volders (n 50 above) 143–
146. Other countries have only three or less decisions with reference to the PICC, according to Unilex. For 
arbitration, see below, Preamble II.
280 F Dessemontet, ‘Use of the UNIDROIT Principles to Interpret and Supplement Domestic Law’ [2002] 
ICC Int’l Ct Arb Bull, Special suppl 39; but see Bonell (n 9 above) 242–243, effectively suggesting that the 
PICC are specialized rules of equity providing corrections to the law.
281 Bonell (n 9 above) 295–296 (with references in n 101); Heggberget and Nyland (n 146 above) 304.
282 See the Dutch decision HR 2 February 2001 (R99/120), Unilex: Art 2.1.13; and the decision by the 
Argentinian Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial de la Capital Federal (CNCom Sala B) 10 June 
2004, Unilex at IV(a)(i): Art 2.1.4.
283 eg Sychold (n 279 above) 154, referring to the 274-page judgment in GEC Marconi (n 287 below): ‘it 
would have been surprising if the UNIDROIT Principles had not been cited somewhere in that mammoth 
product of judicial analysis!’.
284 eg Polish Supreme Court, 6 November 2003: Art 7.4.13; Bonell (n 9 above) 297–299 nn 102–103.
285 Proforce Recruit Ltd v The Rugby Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 69, 57; see MJ Bonell, ‘The UNIDROIT 
Principles and CISG: Sources of Inspiration for English Courts?’ [2006] ULR 305; The Square Mile Partnership 
Ltd v Fitzmaurice McCall Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1690 [61]–[63]. But see Great Hill Equity Partners II LP v 
Novator One LP [2007] EWHC Comm 1210 (denying that Proforce overruled the exclusionary rule); Hideo 
Yoshimoto v Canterbury Golf International Ltd [2001] 1 NZLR 523, 548–549, NZCA (Art 8 CISG and Arts 
4.1–4.3 PICC in favour of liberal interpretation, but ultimately rejected because of contrary views in the 
Privy Council), reversed on other grounds in [2002] UKPC 40, PC. See also E McKendrick, The Creation of 
a European Law of Contracts: The Role of Standard Forms and Principles of Interpretation (2004) 40–43. For the 
rule itself, see Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 
1 WLR 896, 913, HL.
286 See Rechtbank Zwolle 5 March 1997 (HA ZA 95-640), (1997) 15 NIPR 282, Unilex: interpretation of 
good faith in French (as foreign) law based on PICC; M Mustill, ‘The Use of the UNIDROIT Principles by 
National and Supranational Courts’ (unpublished, 1994), cited after Bonell (n 9 above) 238–239.
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The most frequently-used provision of the PICC is the principle of good faith (Art 1.7), 
typically invoked to limit harshness arising from a literal application of law.287 This suggests 
a growing acceptance of such a principle also in international trade, for which the PICC 
certainly have some responsibility. However, given the general character of Art 1.7, this 
is not a typical use for the interpretative purposes of the PICC, whose other provisions 
are adequate for interpretation because they are detailed. Art 1.7 is so general that spe-
cifi c applications of a principle of good faith can be based on it only in part. Use of other 
provisions by state courts is rare; they include Art 2.1.21288 or Art 6.1.4 (with its Offi cial 
Comment 2).289
The most important role of the PICC lies in interpreting open-ended clauses in legislation, 
where domestic law refers to transnational and comparative law, or general principles of 
law,290 or otherwise requires internationally uniform interpretation. Whereas such refer-
ences are rare, the same result arguably occurs where ‘generally recognized principles and 
norms of international law’ are part of domestic law, including private law.291 It is less cer-
tain whether this is also true where a judge is supposed to decide ‘as though he were the 
legislator’, as Art 1(2) Swiss Cc requires: legislators do not necessarily rely on the results of 
comparative law.
The PICC, including the Offi cial Comment, have another important role to play in the 
genetic interpretation of legislation that relies either wholly or partially on the PICC,292 for 
example, in Lithuania.293 They may also play a role for countries in transition towards a 
287 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1, FCA, cited also in Alcatel 
Australia Ltd v Scarcella & Ors (1998) NSWLR 349, NSWSC; see the note by B Zeller [2000] ULR 836; 
Central Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd (2002) 26 WAR 33, WASCA; Aiton v Transfi eld (1999) 153 FLR 
236, NSWSC; GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 50, Federal 
Court of Australia (on these Australian cases, see also Sychold (n 279 above); Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor 
Marketing Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 506, NZCA. For further suggestions in Australian law, see GA Moens, L Cohn 
and D Peacock, ‘A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts: The UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Contracts – The Australian Experience’ (2000) 5 Int’l Trade & Bus L Ann 219, 224–251.
288 CA Grenoble 23 October 1996, [1997] Rev arb 87, Unilex; ES Darankoum, ‘L’application des Principes 
d’UNIDROIT par les arbitres internationaux et par les juges étatiques’ (2002) 36 RJT 421, 437–438.
289 GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (n 287 above), also cited in Tan Hung 
Nguyen v Luxury Design Homes [2004] NSWCA 178, NSWCA.
290 Bonell (n 9 above) 238 names three examples: § 7 Austrian Cc; Art 1 Swiss Cc; Art 6(2) Russian Cc.
291 For Russian law see J Skala, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: a 
Russian Perspective’ in E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on 
Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 119, 124–125.
292 (2003) Study L – Misc 25, para 599 (Schlechtriem). For legislation relying on the PICC, see paras 
118–128 below.
293 Supreme Court of Lithuania 11 February 2002 (3K-3-281/2002), Unilex (Art 6.193 Lithuanian Cc based 
on Art 4.1 PICC); Supreme Court of Lithuania 19 May 2003 (3K-3-612/2003), Unilex (Arts 6.204 Lithuanian 
Cc corresponds in substance to PICC Arts 6.2.1 to 6.2.3), Supreme Court of Lithuania 19 January 2005 (3K-3-
38/2005), Unilex (Art 6.163 of Lithuanian Cc corresponds to PICC Art 2.1.15); Supreme Court of Lithuania 
6 November 2006 (3K-P-382/2006), Unilex; see also Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v Government of the 
Republic of Lithuania and AB Geonafta [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 181, EWHC Comm: there are extensive quotes 
to the commentary on the Lithuanian Civil code with reference to the PICC – on which see the critique by 
L Šaltinytû, ‘Determining the Common Intention to Be Bound by an Arbitration Clause: Svenska Petroleum v 
Republic of Lithuania’ in E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on 
Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 245, 249–252. See Žukas (n 279 above) 236–243, 
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market economy.294 Yet even where the legislation is based on another rule and that rule is 
merely restated in the PICC, the PICC can provide some guidance, based on their restate-
ment function, on the proper meaning and interpretation of the rule. Of course, this can 
only occur where the PICC do indeed restate pre-existing law, and where the pre-existing 
law can be presumed to be in accordance with the PICC.295
Where law must be interpreted according to its goals and purposes, the PICC can be help-
ful to interpret domestic law that was not drafted specifi cally with international contracts 
in mind. By contrast, the PICC can also be used for purely domestic contracts,296 because 
their confi nement to international contracts is not binding (see para 25 above). In this 
case, however, their model purpose is more limited than for international contracts.
To the extent that domestic law should be interpreted on a comparative law basis, the PICC 
provide valuable material. Unlike for uniform law, where such comparative interpretation 
furthers uniformity and the autonomy of international instruments, this is controversial for 
the interpretation of domestic law where international uniformity is typically less impor-
tant.297 The PICC can still play a role based on their model purpose, but in this sense their 
role is not greater than that of other legal systems and regimes.
V. Use as a model (paragraph 7 of the Preamble)
1. Legislation
The PICC are not a model code,298 though they might at some point be transformed into 
one.299 Unlike offi cial model codes, including those adopted by UNIDROIT,300 they 
lack explicit governmental endorsement. Nonetheless, use of the PICC as a model for 
 legislation, originally considered only a supplemental purpose, has become perhaps their 
most important role. 
pointing out the important role of one judge, Mikelûnas, who left the Court in 2006. For infl uence of the 
PICC on the Lithuanian Cc, see para 135 below.
294 Bonell (n 9 above) 234–235.
295 Problematical insofar the Spanish TS (Sala de lo Civil) 4 July 2006 (2421/1999), RJ 2006 no 6080, 
Unilex: Art 1.7 used to interpret § 242 German Cc; see M Perales Viscasillas, ‘La aplicaciòn jurisprudencial en 
España de la Convenciòn de Viena de 1980 sobre compravendita internacional, los Principios de UNIDROIT 
y los Principios del derecho contractual europeo: De la mera referencia a la integraciòn de lagunas’ (2007) 6725 
Diario La Ley, 31 May 2007, 1.
296 eg the Dutch HR 2 February 2001 (n 282 above); see Volders (n 50 above) 147–148 for further opinions; 
Bonell (n 9 above) 299 n 104.
297 For discussions, see B Markesinis and J Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law (2006).
298 Bonell (n 9 above) 243–244 n 196; cf C Kessedjian, ‘Une exercice de rénovation des sources du droit 
des contrats du commerce international: Les Principes proposés par l’UNIDROIT’ [1995] Rev crit dr int privé 
641, 649–650.
299 Bonell (n 9 above) 244.
300 eg UNIDROIT Model Franchise Disclosure Law 2002 (www.unidroit.org/english/modellaws/2002franchise/
main.htm). There is also a proposed UNIDROIT Model Law on Leasing (www.unidroit.org/english/workprogramme/
study059a/main.htm); see also ‘Preparation of a Model Law on Leasing’ [2007] ULR 356.
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Some general insights emerge. First, despite their international  character, they have been 
used even more for domestic than for international legal reform. Most domestic laws on 
commercial contracts are drawn also with international commerce in mind, and in turn the 
PICC are largely not specifi c to international contracts (see para 24 above). Second, the 
PICC have rarely been used as a model in their complete form; more frequent use involves 
individual Chapters of the PICC or even individual rules. This is an appropriate reaction to 
fi ndings that not all norms of the PICC are optimal, in particular for every regional context. 
Third, where the PICC have substantial infl uence, this is regularly due to the infl uence of 
individual advisors acquainted with them. These include Professor Schlechtriem for Estonia 
(see para 134 below) and active promotion—within fi nancial constraints—by UNIDROIT, 
such as for OHADA (see paras 122–124 below).301 Fourth, it is often hard to tell whether 
infl uence comes from the PICC or from the CISG.
(a) Global unifi cation. The PICC play a central role in debates over a global commercial 
code.302 If such a code is created, its relationship to the PICC must be defi ned. According 
to one view, such a code should refer to the PICC as underlying general principles, 
much like Art 7(2) CISG.303 According to another view, the PICC themselves should 
be transformed or at least incorporated into such a code.304 A binding global code, as 
envisaged by some,305 seems both improbable and unattractive; it would also be in tension 
with the nature of the PICC that are decidedly non-binding. A non-binding global 
code, on the other hand, would presumably not look very different from the PICC as 
they exist now.
The PICC can also provide a model for international Conventions, especially those drafted 
by UNIDROIT or other international organizations like UNCITRAL. So far, the CISG 
seems to be more infl uential than the PICC. For example, the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce306 was fi rst drafted on the basis of the CISG and largely rejected 
alternative solutions by the PICC, until the ad hoc expert group of the ICC requested that 
301 H Kronke, ‘Which Type of Activity for Which Organisation? Refl ections on UNIDROIT’s Triennial 
Work Programme 2006–2008 in Context’ [2006] ULR 135, 137–138.
302 G Herrmann, ‘The Role of UNCITRAL’ in I Fletcher et al (eds), Foundations and Perspectives of 
International Trade Law (2001) 28, 35; G Herrmann, ‘The Future of Trade Law Unifi cation’ [2001] IHR 6, 12. 
The idea was fi rst proposed by UNIDROIT in connection with the project that became the PICC: ‘Progressive 
codifi cation of the law of international trade, Note by the Secretariat of the International Institute for the 
Unifi cation of Private Law (UNIDROIT)’ 1968–1970 UNCITRAL Yearbook 285, UN Doc A/CN.9/SER 
A/1970; see also CM Schmitthoff, ‘The Codifi cation of the Law of International Trade’ [1985] JBL 34.
303 MJ Bonell, ‘Do We Need a Global Commercial Code?’ (2001) 106 Dickinson LR 87 = [2000] ULR 469; 
Bonell (n 81 above) 244.
304 O Lando, ‘The CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles in a Global Commercial Code’ in PH Delvaux et 
al (eds), Mélanges offerts à Marcel Fontaine (2003) 451; O Lando, ‘A Global Commercial Code’ [2004] RIW 
161; O Lando, ‘A Vision of a Future World Contract Law: Impact of European and UNIDROIT Contract 
Principles’ (2004) UCC LJ 3; O Lando, ‘CISG and its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt some International 
Principles of Contract Law’ (2005) 53 Am J Comp L 379; (2006) Study L – Misc 25, para 13 (Lando); for 
doubts as to feasibility, see Beraudo (n 128 above) 139.
305 See n 304 above.
306 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce of 12 June 1996 (www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model.html).
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the PICC be considered as well.307 In the future, recourse might rather be had to the PICC, 
especially for the general part of such Conventions.308 The recent commendation of the 
PICC by UNCITRAL (see para 99 above) should help.
However, the PICC are not necessarily well-suited to be a model for transnational unifi ca-
tion. Modern Conventions, especially in the commercial law sector, aim not only for neutral 
terminology (as do the PICC—see para 15 above) but also for self-suffi cient and very specifi c 
rules in view of the desired purposes.309 Although some provisions of the PICC are quite 
specifi c, many are drafted in more general terms. Their better use would be as a general part 
of a transnational law of obligations, supplementing more specifi c Conventions.310 This sug-
gests that Conventions should refer to the PICC as such, rather than be modelled on them.311 
Their more important value could be to provide a common neutral terminology.312
(b) Regional unifi cation
(1) Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa. The most direct 
infl uence on regional codifi cation can be seen in the Organization for the Harmonization 
of Business Law in Africa (OHADA).313 In 2002, the OHADA Council of Ministers 
decided to ask UNIDROIT to provide a draft Uniform Act of Contract314 after previous 
acts for the region had often been based on purely civilian models.315 A Belgian member 
of the PICC drafting group, Professor Fontaine, prepared such a draft on the basis of 
the PICC after consulting with experts from several African countries. The draft Act—
with an Explanatory Note—was published (in French) in 2004, and amended in 2005 
with a view to its coordination with the preliminary draft OHADA Uniform Act on 
Consumer Contracts.316 Unlike the PICC, the draft code was originally intended to cover 
307 ‘Note by the Secretariat on legal aspects of electronic commerce; electronic contracting: provisions for 
a draft convention’ (2002) 33 UNCITRAL Yearbook 406, 412 paras 48 (usefulness of the CISG is evidenced 
by the fact that UNIDROIT used it as a model for the PICC), 68–69 (rejection to adopt Art 2.1 PICC), and 
76 (doubts about Arts 3.5–3.6 PICC); ‘Report of the ad hoc Expert Group of the International Chamber of 
Commerce on the Draft United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Convention on Electronic 
Contracting’ ibid 425, paras 18 (Art 2.1 PICC), 25 (Arts 2.20–2.22 PICC). All article numbers refer to the 
1994 edition of the PICC.
308 See also ‘Report of the Working Group on Electronic Commerce on its thirty-eighth session (New 
York, 12–23 March 2001) (A/CN.9/484)’ (2001) 32 UNCITRAL Yearbook 226, 243 para 124 (avoidance of 
duplicative work by UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT); ‘Draft Model Law on Electronic Signatures: compilation 
of comments by Governments and international organizations’ ibid 303, 308 (comment by Columbia).
309 H Kronke, ‘Der “Commercial Approach” in der Rechtsangleichung und das Internationale Privat- 
und Verfahrensrecht’ in P Gottwald (ed), Festschrift für Dieter Henrich (2000) 386; I Davies, ‘The New Lex 
Mercatoria: International Interests in Global Equipment’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 151, 173–174.
310 Kronke (n 3 above) 459–460.
311 Bonell (n 9 above) 245: ‘term of reference’.
312 ibid 246; see para 15 above.
313 CM Dickerson, ‘Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA Calls the Tune’ (2005) Colum 
J Transnat’l L 17.
314 For an overview, see ‘Preparation by UNIDROIT of a draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contracts’ (www.
unidroit.org/english/legalcooperation/ohada.htm).
315 N Enonchong, ‘The Harmonization of Business Law in Africa: Is Article 42 of the OHADA Treaty a 
Problem?’ (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 95, 97.
316 See ‘Acte uniforme OHADA sur le droit des contrats – avant-projet (May 2006)’ (including references 
to the corresponding PICC articles) and ‘Acte uniforme OHADA sur le droit des contrats – note explicative à 
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commercial and non-commercial contracts; this question is currently open.317 The draft 
is nearly identical to the PICC in order to establish compatibility with developments 
elsewhere in the world:318 161 articles are identical, 31 have been reformulated, and 35 
are new and largely concern areas not governed by the PICC. Matters not covered by the 
PICC were drafted on the basis of the PECL, other recent Western codifi cations, and, to 
some extent, the contract laws of Senegal and Mali.319
The draft Act was submitted to the OHADA member states in 2005 and at this stage has 
been neither adopted nor rejected. Whether it will be successful remains to be seen.320 First, 
OHADA still needs to gain more infl uence on member states; its uniform acts are not yet 
widely enforced.321 Second, the question has been raised (like in the EU) whether unifi ca-
tion of the law of contract is required and legitimate, especially on the basis of a text con-
ceived by some as foreign to African legal traditions.322 Third, the fact that French is the 
exclusive language of the OHADA may pose problems given the degree of affi nity the PICC 
have towards the common law and given that most of their materials are in English.323 
Should these obstacles be overcome, the draft provides a promising basis. Its aim of over-
coming the divide between civil law and common law should be attractive to member states 
whose laws are based on different legal traditions.324 In any case, it should be more attractive 
than the French project for a reform of the law of obligations which has been proposed as a 
viable competitor to the PICC.325 It may then also provide an incentive for other regions in 
l’avant-projet’ (www.unidroit.org/french/legalcooperation/OHADA). For a slightly diverging English version 
of the explicatory note, see M Fontaine, ‘The Draft OHADA Uniform Act on Contracts and the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts’ [2004] ULR 573–584.
317 See Acte Uniforme (n 316 above) Arts 00/1 and 0/1, and the debate in Note explicative (n 316 above) 
paras 21–27; for criticism, see FO Etoundi, ‘Les Principes d’UNIDROIT et la sécurité juridique des transactions 
commerciales dans l’avant-projet d’Acte uniforme OHADA sur le droit des contrats’ [2005] ULR 683, 710–
715; PG Pougoue, ‘L’avant projet d’Acte Uniforme OHADA sur le drot des contrats: les tribulations d’un 
universitaire’ (2007) 3–7 (www.ohada.com/biblio_detail.php?article=914).
318 Note explicative (n 316 above) para 12; Etoundi (n 317 above) 689–692.
319 Note explicative (n 316 above) paras 53–54.
320 A congress on ‘The Harmonisation of contract law in OHADA’, held in Ougadougou in November 2007, 
addressed these questions. See ‘Conference Report: The Harmonisation of Contract Law within OHADA, 
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) – 15–17 November 2007’ [2007] ULR 818. The Acts of the Colloquium will 
be published by UNIDROIT.
321 Dickerson (n 313 above) 62.
322 Vicente (n 42 above) 6–13; Pougoue (n 317 above) 5–6 and passim.
323 Enonchong (n 315 above) 98; see also AT Muna, ‘Is OHADA “Common Law Friendly?”’ (2001) 3 
International Law FORUM du droit international 172; GK Douajni, ‘L’infl uence de l’internationalité dans 
l’élaboration du droit. OHADA’ [2005] Penant – Revue de Droit des Pays d’Afrique (no 851) 174, 186, 188; 
Pougoue (n 317 above) 10–11.
324 SK Date-Bah, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Harmonisation 
of the Principles of Commercial Contracts in West and Central Africa: Refl ections on the OHADA Project 
from the Perspective of a Common Lawyer from West Africa’ [2004] ULR 269, 270–271.
325 K Mbaye, ‘Le destin du Code civil en Afrique’ in Le Code civil 1804–2004: Livre du bicentenaire (2004) 
443; P Meyer, ‘The Preliminary Draft OHADA Uniform Act on Law of Contracts: Innovations and Debates’ 
[2008] Int’l Bus LJ 291.
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Africa, for example the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)326 or the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).327
More problematic is the question of whether the draft Act is suffi ciently sensitive to African 
peculiarities (see para 16 above).328 The main drafter of the Act found virtually no African 
peculiarities requiring signifi cant deviations.329 This appears bold. For example, the absence 
of formal requirements in Art 1.2 PICC (Art 1/3 of the draft Act) may confl ict with a tradi-
tional African emphasis on formal contracts.330 If this is viewed as a problem, local usages 
can be implemented through Art 1.9 PICC (Art 1/8 of the draft Act).331 At the same time, 
the draft Act has been praised precisely because it can overcome the colonial and customary 
heritage of African law and adapt Africa to modern commercial exigencies.332
(2) Others. For a possible European contract law codifi cation,333 the PICC are not prima 
facie as relevant as other projects, most notably the PECL, but are frequently listed among 
infl uential models.334 Currently, the EU is planning for a so-called Common Frame of 
Reference (CFR), a quasi-codifi cation with a legal nature that is as yet unclear.335 The 
CFR will combine two infl uences: the so-called acquis of existing EU contract law336 and 
fi ndings of comparative law, likely to be based on the results of the successor to the Lando 
Group, the so-called Study Group on a European Civil Code (which goes beyond mere 
contract law).337 At least insofar as the PICC still maintain an infl uence on the latter, 
326 Date-Bah (n 324 above) 271.
327 Kronke (n 3 above) 464; S Mancuso, ‘Trends on the Harmonization of Contract Law in Africa’ (2007) 
13 Annual Survey of Int’l & Comp Law 157. See also Meyer (n 325 above).
328 S Melone, ‘Les résistances du droit traditionnel au droit moderne des obligations’ (1977) Revue 
Sénégalaise de Droit 47.
329 Note explicative (n 316 above) paras 12–18.
330 Etoundi (n 317 above) 701–703.
331 ibid 703–705.
332 ibid 692, 699–706, 708–710; RF Oppong, ‘Re-Imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent 
Trends in the Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Africa’ (2007) 30 Fordham Int’l 
LJ 296, 337–338.
333 N Jansen, ‘European Civil Code’ in J Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2006) 247–
258. 
334 B Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘Droit européen et international des contrats: l’apport des codifi cation doctrinales’ 
[2007] D 96; G Weiszberg, ‘Les premières années de jurisprudence sur la “contravention non essentielle” dans 
la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 sur la vente internationale de marchandises’ [2006] Int’l Bus LJ 106; 
Jung (n 4 above); R Zimmermann, ‘European Contrat Law: General Report’ [2007] EuZW 455, 456–457; 
MJ Bonell, ‘European Contract Law and the Development of Contract Law Worldwide’ in 4. Europäischer 
Juristentag – 4th European Jurists’ Forum – 4ème Journée des Juristes Européens (2008) 85.
335 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: European Contract 
Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward, 11 October 2004, COM(2004) 651 fi nal. See also C von 
Bar et al (prepared by), Principles, Defi nitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR) – Interim Outline Edition (2008).
336 Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group), Principles of the Existing EC Contract 
Law (Acquis Principles): Contract I – Pre-contractual Obligations, Conclusion of Contract, Unfair Terms (2007) 
(www.acquis-group.org).
337 Published studies are C von Bar (prepared by), Benevolent Intervention in Another’s Affairs (PEL Ben 
Int) (2006); MW Hesselink et al (prepared by), Commercial Agency, Franchise and Distribution Contracts (PEL 
CAFDC) (2006); M Baudendrecht et al (prepared by), Service Contracts (PEL SC) (2007); U Drobing (prepared 
by), Personal Security (PEL Pers Sec) (2007); K Lilleholt et al (prepared by), Lease of Goods (PEL LG) (2008); E 
Hondius and others (prepared by), Sales (PEL S) (2008). Nine more volumes are planned (http://sgecc.net).
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they will also be indirectly infl uential on any future Common Frame of Reference.338 In 
addition, some infl uence exists because the acquis in turn shows some infl uence by the 
PECL and thereby, indirectly, the PICC.339 Arguably, it makes sense for the drafters of 
the CFR to consider the PICC directly, too, given their model purpose (see paras 5–6 
above).340 Of course, it will be necessary to account for the fact that consumer contracts, 
explicitly (though unconvincingly) excluded from the PICC (see paras 26–27 above), will 
likely play a central role in any European codifi cation.341
For some time hope existed that the PICC could serve as a model for a unifi ed contract law 
in Latin America,342 where the core of the various countries’ contract law is said to be very 
similar to that of the PICC.343 The most promising institutional framework for any such 
unifi cation could have been provided by MERCOSUR, which views contract law as one of 
its prime goals of unifi cation. However, it appears that both traditional limitations to pri-
vate law unifi cation in Latin America344 and the decreasing role of MERCOSUR in general 
make such projects, as of now, rather unlikely. The PICC have also been proposed as the 
basis for a supranational contract law for NAFTA,345 but it does not appear as though con-
tract law harmonization is on the agenda.346 Projects for a unifi ed contract law within the 
Organization of American States (OAS) have not yet yielded specifi c results.347
338 U Blaurock, ‘Lex mercatoria und Common Frame of Reference’ [2007] ZEuP 118, 126–128. For direct 
infl uence Jung (n 4 above) 87. 
339 R Schulze, ‘Die “Acquis-Grundregeln” und der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen’ [2007] ZEuP 731, 733.
340 Jung (n 4 above) 88–89.
341 Wilhelmsson (n 70 above); Jung (n 4 above) 83.
342 LO Baptista, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles: a possible model for the harmonisation of international 
contract law in the context of the regional integration of the Americas, with special reference to MERCOSUR’ 
in UNIDROIT (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles: a Common Law of Contracts for the Americas? (1998) 119; 
L Borjas Hernández, ‘Los Principios de UNIDROIT: Un modelo posible con miras a la armonización del 
derecho de los contratos comerciales internacionales en el contexto de la integración regional en las Américas?’ 
ibid 137, 144–145; S Schipani, ‘Armonización y unifi cación del derecho: derecho común en materia de 
obligaciones y contratos en América Latina’ in J Adame Goddard (ed), Derecho privado: Memoria del Congreso 
Internacional de Culturas y Sistemas Jurídicos Comparados (2005) 665, 694–695. For comparison of individual 
rules, see MJ Bonell and S Schipani (eds), ‘Principi per i contratti commerciali internazionali’ e il sistema giuridico 
latinoamericano (1996).
343 AM Garro, ‘Unifi cation and Harmonization of Private Law in Latin America’ (1992) 40 Am J Comp L 
587, 608–610; AA Alterini, ‘Los Principios de UNIDROIT y las soluciones del derecho común’ in UNIDROIT 
(ed), The UNIDROIT Principles: a Common Law of Contracts for the Americas? (1998) 259; JC Rivera, ‘Los 
Principios UNIDROIT: una alternativa de morigeración de la lex mercatoria para Lationamérica’ in in J Adame 
Goddard (ed), Derecho privado: Memoria del Congreso Internacional de Culturas y Sistemas Jurídicos Comparados 
(2005) 413, 417–419; MA Gwynn, Contratos internacionales para el sector privado: Estudios comparativos entre 
principios de UNIDROIT y el MERCOSUR (2007).
344 Garro (n 343 above) 610–613.
345 J Adane, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles and NAFTA’ (1997) 4 Annual Survey of Int’l & Comp Law 56.
346 AM Garro, ‘Legal Framework for Regional Integration in the Americas: Inter-American Convention and 
Beyond’ in F Ferrari (ed), The Unifi cation of International Commercial Law (1998) 85, 89.
347 See Presentation of the SLA/CIDA Project: ‘Legal Harmonization in the Americas: Business Transactions, 
Bijuralism and the OAS’ CP/CAJP-1881/02, 26 February 2002 (www.oas.org/consejo/CAJP/docs/cp09310e04.
doc); N Bourély, ‘The Context for Transactional Legal Harmonization in the Americas’ in OAS Secretariat for 
Legal Affairs (ed), Legal Harmonization in the Americas. Business Transactions, Bijuralism and the OAS (2002) 7 
(www.oas.org/legal/english/osla/bourely.doc).
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The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) showed an early interest in the 
PICC as a model for their own codifi cation.348 Now, there are plans for ‘Asian Principles of 
Contract Law’, based in part on the PICC.349 But contract law unifi cation is not currently 
among the projects envisaged by ASEAN.350 A proposal for the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO) between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey was not taken up.351
(c) National legislation. The broadest success for the PICC has come in the area of 
domestic law reform. Although no domestic codifi cation has used them wholly as a 
model, at the same time almost every recent project has used them as at least one of 
its various sources of inspiration. Their explicitly international focus does not bar such 
use for domestic legislation (see para 25 above) and may indeed be an advantage, if law 
reform tries to overcome an assumed parochial character of traditional domestic contract 
law. Also, their non-binding character rightly does not prevent lawmakers from using 
the PICC, since what makes them attractive are both their restatement character—the 
lawmakers know when they are in accordance with other legal systems—and their model 
character—they provide prima facie good rules. If provisions in domestic law are based on 
rules of the PICC, this can be relevant to their interpretation (see para 115 above).
(1) Europe. Mutual infl uence between the Dutch Cc and the PICC was especially 
fruitful for both codes and resulted in a large degree of similarity, such as regards the 
abolition of causa as a requirement for contract validity, and the detailed rules on offer 
and acceptance.352 Also, the styles are quite similar, as were the working methods of the 
authors.353
Infl uence on the current French reform project of the law of obligations and the law of 
prescription354 is mostly either negative or non-existent.355 The project was in some degree 
348 Letter of the [Australian] Attorney General’s Department to the Secretary-General of UNIDROIT of 19 
November 1993, as quoted in Bonell (n 9 above) 244–245.
349 R Amoussou-Guenou, ‘Perspectives des Principes Asean (ou Asiatiques) du droit des contrats’ [2005] Int’l 
Bus LJ 573; B Hardjowahono, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles and the Law Governing Commercial Contracts 
in Southeast Asia’ [2002] ULR 1005, especially 1010–1011 and 1013–1014; Hardjowahono (n 182 above) 
167–176.
350 www.aseansec.org/asean_project.htm.
351 Bijan Izadi, ‘Harmonisation of Commercial Contract Law in the ECO Region: a Role for the UNIDROIT 
Principles’ [2001] ULR 301, 308–314.
352 Volders (n 50 above) 135, 137–139. For an explicit article-by-article comparison with the PECL, see D 
Busch et al (eds), The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law: A Commentary (2002).
353 Volders (n 50 above) 136–137 and 139–141.
354 P Catala (ed), Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription (2006) (English 
translation at http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/iecl/research.shtml). See B Fauvarque-Cosson and D Mazeaud, 
‘L’avant-projet français de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription’ [2006] ULR 103, 
and Issue 1 of [2006] RDC, La réforme du droit des contrats: projet et perspectives (Acte du colloque du 25 octobre 
2005), with the text of the reform proposals ibid 199. In English, see B Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘Towards a New 
French Law of Obligations and Prescription? About the Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de 
la prescription’ [2007] ZEuP 428; S Vogenauer, ‘The Avant-projet de réforme: an Overview’ in J Cartwright 
et al (eds), Reforming the French Law of Obligations: Comparative Observations on the Avant-projet de réforme 
du droit des obligations et de la prescription (the ‘Avant-projet Catala’) (forthcoming 2009, with an annotated 
English translation of the reform proposals in the Appendix).
355 D Tallon, ‘Teneur et valeur du projet appréhendé dans une perspective comparative’ [2006] RDC 131; 
D Mazeaud, ‘Observations conclusives’ [2006] RDC 177, 179–180.
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drafted to maintain French peculiarities as a counter-attack against the Europeanization 
and globalization of contract law.356 Nonetheless, the PICC were occasionally consulted 
positively, especially with regard to prescription.357
When the German government proposed a reformed law of obligations in 2000, one criti-
cism was that comparative law, including the PECL and the PICC, had not been suffi -
ciently consulted.358 The fi nally-adopted reform does reveal infl uences from the PECL and 
the PICC, especially with regard to a unifi ed concept of breach of contract and in the law of 
prescription, which follows the PECL.359 It may not have been irrelevant that the same 
scholar, Professor Zimmermann, was responsible for the law of prescription in the PECL 
and in the earlier project for a reform of the German law of obligations.360
The Scottish Law Commission referred to the PICC regularly in the 1990s,361 ‘so as to 
ensure that Scottish law benefi ts from the best international practice in this area’.362 The 
Law Commission for England and Wales seems less interested so far.363 Surprisingly, 
the PECL are not used more frequently than the PICC, although the Chairman of the 
Commission, Professor Beale, was a prominent member of the PECL group. In Ireland, 
Arts 5.2.1–5.2.6 PICC have been used as ‘a further indication that in international com-
mercial transactions there is a trend towards facilitating the enforceability of third party 
rights where to do so will give effect to the clear intentions of the contracting parties’.364
The PICC have been quite infl uential on recent law reform in Spain. They were used, 
alongside the CISG and the PECL, as inspiration for the 2006 proposal to modify the 
356 B Fauvarque-Cosson and D Mazeaud, ‘L’avant-projet français de réforme du droit des obligations et du 
droit de la prescription’ [2006] ULR 103, 128–132.
357 ibid 106. See also O Lando, ‘L’avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et les Principes du droit 
européen du contrat: analyse de certaines différences’ [2006] RDC 127. For comparison of current French law 
with the PICC and the PECL, see P Malinvaud, Droit des obligations (10th edn, 2007).
358 R Zimmermann, The New German Law of Obligations (2005) 34; O Meyer, ‘Principi internazionali del 
diritto dei contratti nella riforma del diritto tedesco delle obligazioni’ [2004] Contr impr Europa 824, 826–828.
359 ibid 828–830; E Lein, ‘La portée pratique des Principes UNIDROIT: une perspective allemande’ in 
E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on Contractual Practice, 
Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 169, 182–185.
360 F Peters and R Zimmermann, ‘Der Einfl uss von Fristen auf Schuldverhältnisse. Möglichkeiten der 
Vereinheitlichung von Verjährungsfristen’ in Bundesminister der Justiz (ed), Gutachten und Vorschläge zur 
Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts (1981); R Zimmermann, ‘The New German Law of Prescription and Chapter 
14 of the PECL’ in A Vaquer (ed), La Tercera Parte de los Principios de Derecho Contractual Europeo/The 
Principles of European Contract Law Part III (2005) 451; for a comparison of the PECL and the PICC rules on 
prescription, see R Zimmermann, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004 
in Comparative Perspective’ (2006) 21 Tul Eur & Civ L Forum 1, 8–20.
361 Discussion Paper 109 on Remedies for Breach of Contract (April 1999); Report on Interpretation in 
Private Law (Scot Law Com No 160, 1997); Report on Penalty Clauses (Scot Law Com No 171, 1999); Report 
on Remedies for Breach of Contract (Scot Law Com No 174, 1999). Reference to the PECL but not to the 
PICC is made in Report on Interest on Debt and Damage (Scot Law Com, 2006) no 3.14 (www.scotlawcom.
gov.uk/html/publications.html).
362 Fifth Programme on Law Reform (Scot Law Com No 159, 1997) no 2.22.
363 But see Consultation Paper No 167: Compound Interests (2002) nos 3.16–3.17.
364 Consultation Paper. Privity of Contract: Third Party Rights (2006), nos 1.157–1.158 (www.lawcom.gov.
uk/docs/cp167.pdf ).
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 general part of the Spanish Commercial Code.365 They are also among the sources used for 
a proposed new law on distribution contracts.366 In particular, Art 9 of the proposal incor-
porates, almost verbatim, Arts 3.5, 3.13(1)(1), and 3.7 PICC.
The PICC have been infl uential on codifi cations in formerly socialist countries. The 
Lithuanian Cc of 2000 draws especially on the rules on contract formation and those on 
quality of performance and contract price.367 The PICC were also among the materials 
consulted for the 2002 Estonian Law of Obligations Act.368 Some limited infl uence can also 
be found in the fi rst draft of the new Hungarian Civil code369 and the Green Book for a new 
Polish codifi cation.370
(2) The Americas. Since the Québec Cc was fi nalized in the same year as the 1994 edition 
of the PICC, this fi rst edition could not have had a direct infl uence. However, Professor 
Crépeau, author of an earlier draft of the Québec Cc and one of the drafters of the PICC, 
has found the new Québec Cc to be defi cient in comparison with the PICC, especially as 
regards contractual justice, and has proposed amendments to it in light of the PICC.371 
The new Brazilian Civil Code of 2003 adopted provisions on gross disparity and hardship 
in accordance with Arts 3.10 and 6.2.1 PICC; whether the infl uence comes from the PICC 
or from the legal systems underlying them, in particular the CISG, is not certain.372
(3) Asia-Pacifi c. Although the most important infl uence on the Chinese Contract Law of 
1999373 was the CISG, the PICC—available in Chinese since 1996—were independently 
365 Comisión general de codifi cación: sección de derecho mercantil, ‘Propuesta de anteproyecto de ley de 
modifi cación del código de comercio en la parte general sobre contratos mercantiles y sobre prescripción y 
caducidad’ (2006) Boletín de Información del Ministerio de Justicia 605, especially 605–606; for detailed 
analysis, see A Martínez Cañellas, ‘The Infl uence of the UNIDROIT Principles on the Proposal of the Reform 
of the Spanish Commercial Code’ in E Cashin Ritaine and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their 
Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and Codifi cation (2007) 215.
366 Comisión general de codifi cación: sección de derecho mercantil, ‘Propuesta de anteproyecto de ley de 
contratos de distribución’ (2006) Boletín de Información del Ministerio de Justicia 618, 619, 620.
367 V Mikelenas, ‘Unifi cation and Harmonisation of Law at the Turn of the Millennium: The Lithuanian 
Experience’ [2000] ULR 253; V Mikelenas, ‘The Main Features of the New Lithuanian Contract Law System 
Based on the Civil Code of 2000’ [2005] Juridica International 42, 47 and 50; Žukas (n 279 above); Svenska 
Petroleum Exploration AB v Government of the Republic of Lithuania and AB Geonafta (n 293 above) 30.
368 V Kõve, ‘Applicable Law in the Light of Modern Law of Obligations and Bases for the Preparation of 
the Law of Obligations Act’ [2001] Juridica International 30, 37; P Varul, ‘CISG: A Source of Inspiration for 
the Estonian Law of Obligations’ [2003] ULR 209; K Pavkovic, ‘Estonia: A Model for Economic Success in 
Transition Economies’ (2007) 19 Pacifi c McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 531, 538, 
541. Professor Schlechtriem, as external expert advisor, is greatly responsible for this infl uence.
369 P Gárdos, ‘Recodifi cation of the Hungarian Civil Law’ (2007) 15 ERPL 707, 721; (2004) CD (83) 24, 
Item 7 (Hármathy), cited after Bonell (n 111 above) 8 n 16.
370 Z Radwaûski (ed), Civil Law Codifi cation Commission, Green Paper: An Optimal Vision of the Civil Code of 
the Republic of Poland (2006) (www.ejcl.org/112/greenbookfi nal-2.pdf ).
371 PA Crépeau and ÉM Charpentier, Les Principes d’UNIDROIT et le Code civil du Québec: valeurs partagées? 
= The UNIDROIT Principles and the Civil Code of Québec: Shared Values? (1998); for a shorter version, see 
PA Crépeau, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts’ in AM Rabello (ed), The 
Principles of UNIDROIT and Modern National Codifi cations (2001) 21, especially 61. For comparison, see also 
Sabourin (n 223 above), with a synopsis at pp 275–280.
372 E Grebler, ‘The Convention on International Sale of Goods and Brazilian Law: Are Differences 
Irreconcilable?’ (2005–06) 25 J L & Com 467, 470.
373 www.cclaw.net/download/contractlawPRC.asp.
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infl uential to some degree, too, especially where they are more detailed than the CISG.374 
The PICC are sometimes also used as a model for proposed further legal reforms.375 Their 
infl uence on other East Asian laws is unknown, but it can be presumed that countries like 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia will look to the PICC for guidance in their reform 
efforts,376 as will Mongolia.377
The drafters of the three parts of the Russian Cc (between 1994 and 2001) are reported to 
have relied frequently on the PICC,378 even though direct infl uence is diffi cult to assess.379 
For example, Art 451 (hardship) of the Russian Cc is very similar to the PICC doctrine of 
hardship.380 The PICC are also among the models consulted for the new Israeli Civil 
code.381
In Australia, the role of the legislator in contract law is too minimal to enable signifi cant 
infl uence of the PICC.382 The same is true for New Zealand, where contract statutes pre-
date the PICC. Nonetheless, the use of the PICC as a model for a new contract code has 
been proposed there.383
374 Danhan (n 177 above) 109–114; X-Y Li-Kotovchikhine, ‘Le nouveau droit chinois des contrats 
internationaux’ (2002) 129 Clunet 113, 116; B Ling, Contract Law in China (2002) 37–38; see also H Kronke, 
‘Der Gesetzgeber als Rechtsvergleicher: Aspekte der chinesischen Vertragsrechtsreform’ in J Basedow et al (eds), 
Festschrift für Ulrich Drobnig zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (1998) 579. The infl uence of the PICC is perhaps 
exaggerated in J Xi, ‘The Impact of the UNIDROIT Principles on Chinese Legislation’ in E Cashin Ritaine 
and E Lein (eds), The UNIDROIT Principles 2004: Their Impact on Contractual Practice, Jurisprudence and 
Codifi cation (2007) 107, 111–112; G Lefebvre and J Jiao, ‘Les Principes d’UNIDROIT et le droit chinois: 
convergence et dissonance’ (2002) 36 RJT 519, 525; (2006) Study L – Misc 25, para 30 (Zhang). For 
comparisons between the New Contract Law and the PICC, see Z Yuqing and H Dhanhan, ‘The New Contract 
Law in the People’s Republic of China and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: 
a Brief Comparison’ [2000] ULR 429; Xi (this note) 112–118; Z Yuejiao, Harmonization of contract law and its 
impacts on China’s contract law (2007) part 4.2 (www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Zhang.pdf ).
375 S Jiang, ‘Guo Ji Shang Shi He Tong Tong Ze Yu Wo Guo He Tong Fa De Wan Shan [The UNIDROIT 
Principles and the Perfection of Chinese Contract Law]’ (2001) Dui Wai Jing Mao Shi Wu [Practices in Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade] Issue 8 p 12; Y Zhang, ‘Yi Bu Xian Dai, Tong Yi Zi He Tong Fa---Jie Pin “Guo 
Ji Shang Shi He Tong Tong Ze 2004 [A Modern and Unifi ed Contract Law: Introduction to and Comment on 
the UNIDROIT Principles 2004]’ [2005] Beijing Zhong Cai [Beijing Arbitration] Issue 4 pp 57–64.
376 Letter (n 348 above); Le Net, ‘Rules of Interpretation of Contracts under the UNIDROIT Principles and 
their Possible Adoption in Vietnamese Law’ [2002] ULR 1017. A scholar is currently working on a potential 
use for Indonesian law reform: see (2007) CD (87) 2, p 22.
377 Bonell (n 9 above) 269 n 22.
378 AS Komarov, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contract: A Russian View’ 
[1996] ULR 247, 248; AG Doudko, ‘Hardship in Contract: The Approach of the UNIDROIT Principles and 
Legal Development in Russia’ [2000] ULR 483; JF Bourque and JS Roure, ‘Introducing international standards 
to central and eastern Europe: the role of model international trade contracts’ in European Bank for Research 
and Development (ed), Law in Transition: Central Asia (2003) 2–8 (http://ebrd.com/pubs/legal/lit031.pdf ); 
Skala (n 291 above) 119, 120.
379 Skala (n 291 above) 120.
380 Doudko (n 378 above): Skala (n 291 above) 122–124.
381 AM Rabello and P Lerner, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and 
Israeli Contract Law’ [2003] ULR 601, 606.
382 Sychold (n 279 above) 149.
383 R Sutton, ‘Commentary on “Codifi cation, Law Reform and Judicial Development”: Appendix – Tentative 
Scheme for a Draft Code’ (1996) 9 JCL 204–205.
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2. Contract drafting
For the 2004 edition of the PICC, contract drafting was proposed as an explicit purpose 
named in the Preamble.384 The suggestion was rejected because changes were to be kept to 
a minimum, but their role in contract drafting was acknowledged and is explicitly listed in 
the Offi cial Comment.385 The PICC can help contract drafting in various ways: as actual 
model terms, as a checklist for relevant issues, as a baseline of what is considered fair, and as 
vocabulary for a neutral terminology. For incorporation of the PICC into a contract, see 
para 33 above.
The use of the PICC as actual model terms is not listed in the Offi cial Comment. Indeed, 
in formulating the 2004 edition of the PICC, the word ‘guide’ was preferred to that of 
‘model’.386 In view of this modest aspiration, it seems a stretch to view the PICC as a codi-
fi cation of best contractual practices.387 The use of the PICC as actual model terms is in 
tension both with their general nature and their character.388 The PICC are written as back-
ground law for actual contracts rather than as a model for those contracts themselves or as 
a codifi cation of current contract practice;389 their often general and open-ended style is 
frequently not in accordance with the needs for specifi city and accuracy in actual contracts. 
Particularly unfi t are general rules like those on force majeure that give the adjudicator a 
great level of discretion.390 By contrast, specifi c individual provisions may well be good 
models for contract terms (such as Arts 6.1.9–6.1.10, 6.1.14–6.1.17, and 7.4.9),391 espe-
cially where the PICC contain rules specifi cally aimed at international contracts (see para 
25 above).392
The PICC can serve as a checklist for relevant issues. This encompasses issues to be dealt 
with in the contract, especially those specifi c to international contracts.393 However, the fact 
384 (2003) Study L – Doc 85, p 7 (section II A 1): ‘They may serve as a model in drafting contracts’. See 
generally Petz (n 4 above) 84–89.
385 (2003) Study L – Misc 25, para 593; Off Cmt 8 to Preamble, p  7; viewed as the most important use by 
parties, at least in the short term, by Kahn (n 21 above) 49.
386 (2003) Study L – Misc 25, paras 583 (Date-Bah) and 586 (Schlechtriem: ‘check-list’).
387 B Kozolchyk, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles as a model for the unifi cation of the best contractual practices 
in the Americas’ in UNIDROIT (ed), The UNIDROIT Principles: a Common Law of Contracts for the Americas? 
(1998) 93, 109–114.
388 EA Farnsworth, ‘An American View of the Principles as a Guide to Drafting Contracts’ in Institute of 
International Business Law and Practice (ed), UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts: A 
New Lex Mercatoria? (ICC publication no 490/1) (1995) 85, 87–88; V Gaymer, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles 
as a Guide for Drafting Contracts: A View from an International Commercial Lawyer’ ibid 95, 99.
389 M Fontaine, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles: An Expression of Current Contract Practice?’ [2002] ICC 
Int’l Ct Arb Bull, Special suppl 95.
390 Farnsworth (n 388 above) 90–91.
391 M Fontaine, ‘Les Principes UNIDROIT, guide de la rédaction des contrats internationaux’ in Institute of 
International Business Law and Practice (ed), UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts: A 
New Lex Mercatoria? (ICC publication no 490/1) (1995) 73, 76; H van Houtte, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles 
as a Guide for Drafting Contracts’ ibid 115, 119; P Kahn, ‘Les Principes UNIDROIT comme droit applicable 
aux contrats internationaux’ in MJ Bonell and F Bonelli (eds), Contratti commerciali internazionali e Principi 
UNIDROIT (1997) 39, 52–54.
392 Fontaine (n 391 above) 79–80.
393 eg ibid 77; Farnsworth (n 388 above) 91–92; van Houtte (n 391 above) 120, insofar like van Houtte 
(n 31 above) 8; G de Nova, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles as a Guide for Drafting International Contracts’ in 
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that the PICC themselves are incomplete even for matters of general contract law and 
exclude matters of special contract law (see para 17 above) restricts their use in this regard.394 
In addition, the rules on offer and acceptance can be useful, not for the content of the con-
tract (since such rules are rarely agreed upon) but as a checklist, during the formation stage, 
of issues to be considered in the drafting of offers and acceptances.395
The PICC can also provide a baseline of what is considered fair in international contracts 
irrespective of the laws of specifi c countries.396 This means that whoever wants terms in the 
contract deviating from the PICC bears the burden of argument and may, to prevail, have 
to make concessions on other issues, either in contract terms or with respect to the price.
Finally, the PICC can give terminological guidance in two respects. First, their use of neu-
tral concepts (see para 15 above) can help parties to avoid terms with specifi c meanings in 
their own legal systems. Second, the fact that they exist in multiple languages can help in 
translating concepts and providing common understanding of terms used in contracts.397
Although the PICC have been proposed as a model for model contracts developed with a 
view to specifi c contracts, they are too vague and contain too many open-ended rules to 
adequately fulfi l such a purpose. Their use is that of a general background for specifi c model 
contracts, to be referred to and, where necessary, incorporated in part. They can also pro-
vide a valuable uniform vocabulary for the otherwise disparate model contracts that exist.398 
Some PICC provisions have been received in this way in model contracts prepared by the 
ICC,399 UNCITRAL, and the ITC;400 more uniformity would be desirable.
3. Mediation
Although the PICC do not contain rules specifi c to alternative dispute resolution (with the 
exception of Art 10.7), they have been proposed as a model for solutions in mediation 
because of their emphasis on good faith.401 Their utility is limited. Mediation takes place 
usually in view of both the background of applicable law and in view of non-legal principles; 
the PICC, as non-applicable legal rules, are neither. However, based on their model nature 
and insofar as they codify what is generally considered fair, they can provide a helpful 
Institute of International Business Law and Practice (ed), UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial 
Contracts: A New Lex Mercatoria? (ICC publication no 490/1) (1995) 129.
394 Beraudo (n 128 above); de Nova (n 393 above) 133–134.
395 Farnsworth (n 388 above) 89–90.
396 Fontaine (n 391 above) 77–79; van Houtte (n 391 above) 120.
397 ibid.
398 K Razumov, ‘Les contrats commerciaux internationaux et les nouveaux Principes UNIDROIT: la pratique 
contractuelle commerciale russe’ in Institute of International Business Law and Practice (ed), UNIDROIT 
Principles for International Commercial Contracts: A New Lex Mercatoria? (ICC publication no 490/1) (1995) 
105, 110–111.
399 Mourre and Jolivet (n 110 above) 280–289; F Bortolotti, ‘Reference to the UNIDROIT Principles in 
Contract Practice and Model Contracts’ [2005] ICC Int’l Ct Arb Bull, Special suppl 57, 61–63.
400 ibid 63–64; Vulliéty (n 260 above) 303–313.
401 JF Smith, ‘Mediation and the Principles of UNIDROIT’ in Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas (ed), 
Contratación Internacional: Comentarios a los Principios sobre los Contratos Comerciales Internacionales del 
UNIDROIT (1998) 237, 247–250.
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 additional baseline. In addition, some of their rules may be helpful to mediators seeking 
specifi c solutions.
4. Legal education
Use in legal education is mentioned as an explicit additional purpose in the Offi cial 
Comment,402 but it actually transcends all three purposes. Obviously, the PICC can be 
used in teaching to all purposes (see paras 1–8 above): as a result of comparative law (the 
restatement function), as a potentially optimal set of rules (the model function), and as a 
possible reference by judges or parties in actual matters (the effective law purpose). It is with 
regard to the last purpose that their use in education is most necessary: they will not be used 
unless young lawyers learn about them.403 In addition, UNIDROIT is taking active mea-
sures to promote and disseminate the PICC.404 For a long time, the PICC were not widely 
taught in many countries,405 but this appears to be changing with regard to courses in law 
schools406 and to consideration in student textbooks.407
402 Off Cmt 8 to Preamble, p 7.
403 Bonell (n 9 above) 260–261, 369.
404 (2006) Study L – Doc 99, paras 2–8; (2006) Study L – Misc 25, paras 6–33.
405 eg R Goode, ‘Insularity or Leadership? The Role of the United Kingdom in the Harmonisation of 
Commercial Law’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 751, 764; for the USA see MJ Gordon, ‘Part II: Some Thoughts on the 
Receptiveness of Contract Rules in the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles as Refl ected in One State’s (Florida) 
Experience of (1) Law School Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar with an International Practice, and (3) Judges’ 
(1998) 46 Am J Comp L, Suppl 361, 364–367.
406 See already the very optimistic list of law schools in MJ Bonell, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice: 
The Experience of the First Two Years’ [1997] ULR 34, 36–37; see also Bonell (n 9 above) 267 n 13: ‘since 
then their number has been increasing’. For national examples, see J Lookofsky, ‘Denmark’ in MJ Bonell (ed), 
A New Approach to International Contracts: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts (1999) 71, 72; 
M Fontaine, ‘Belgium’ ibid 55, 63; B Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘France’ ibid 95, 99 n 12; F de Ly, ‘Netherlands’ ibid 
203, 205–206; C Hultmark, ‘Sweden’ ibid 308 (n 118 above); Mikelenas (n 367 above); (2006) Study L – Misc 
25, paras 10 (Russia – Komarov), 11 (Japan – Uchida), 18 (Québec – Crépau), 24 (USA – Garro), 31 (Italy – 
Alpa); Le Net (n 376 above) 1028–1030.
407 eg EA Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (2nd edn, 2001); R Goode et al, Transnational Commercial 
Law (2007); Malinvaud (n 357); H Beale et al, Ius Commune Casebooks on the Common Law of Europe: Cases, 
Materials and Text on Contract Law (2002).
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